

FRAGILE STATES INDEX





The Fund for Peace is an independent, nonpartisan, 501(c)(3) non-profit research and educational organization that works to prevent violent conflict and promote sustainable security. We promote sustainable security through research, training and education, engagement of civil society, building bridges across diverse sectors, and developing innovative technologies and tools for policy makers. A leader in the conflict assessment and early warning field, The Fund for Peace focuses on the problems of weak and failing states. Our objective is to create practical tools and approaches for conflict mitigation that are useful to decision-makers.

Copyright © 2017 The Fund for Peace.

All rights reserved.

No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior written consent from The Fund for Peace.

Report Edited by	Assessment Directed by
J. J. Messner	Nate Haken

THE FRAGILE STATES INDEX TEAM

J. J. Messner, Nate Haken, Patricia Taft, Hannah Blyth, Marcel Maglo, Christina Murphy, Amanda Quinn, Laura Brisard, Logan Cuthbert, Daniel Fitzgerald, Hepsibah Nanyongo Effange, Charles Fidler, Charles Fiertz, McKenzie Hanlon, Kelly Hoye, Alexandra Kelly, Leo Rosenberg, Cathryn Shelton, Sarah Silverman, Mazhar Syed, Tanmai Vemulapalli, Alexander Young

The Fund for Peace
1101 14th Street NW, Suite 1020
Washington, D.C. 20005

T: +1 202 223 7940
F: +1 202 223 7947
www.fundforpeace.org



The Cipher Brief is the media partner of the Fragile States Index.

FRAGILE STATES INDEX

The Fragile States Index (FSI) is an annual ranking of 178 countries based on the different pressures they face that impact their levels of fragility. The Index is based on The Fund for Peace's proprietary Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) analytical approach. Based on comprehensive social science methodology, three primary streams of data — quantitative, qualitative, and expert validation — are triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the FSI. Millions of documents are analyzed every year, and by applying highly specialized search parameters, scores are apportioned for every country based on twelve key political, social and economic indicators and over 100 sub-indicators that are the result of years of expert social science research.

INTERPRETING THE FSI SCORES

The 2017 FSI, the 13th edition of the annual Index, comprises data collected between January 1, 2016 and December 31, 2016 — thus, certain well-publicized events that have occurred since January 1, 2017 are not covered by the 2017 Index. The FSI scores should be interpreted with the understanding that the lower the score, the better. Therefore, a reduced score indicates an improvement and greater relative stability, just as a higher score indicates greater instability. For an explanation of the various indicators and their icons, please refer to page 27. FFP attempts as much as possible to de-emphasize rankings, as it is our firm belief that a country's overall score (and indeed, its indicator scores) are a far more important and accurate barometer of a country's performance, and that as much as countries should be compared against other countries, it is more useful to compare a country against itself, over time. Hence, our analysis focuses more on specific indicator scores or trend lines over time rather than just rankings. Ultimately, the FSI is an entry point into deeper interpretive analysis by civil society, government, businesses and practitioners alike — to understand more about a state's capacities and pressures which contribute to levels of fragility and resilience.

FRAGILE STATES INDEX 2017

2017 Map	4
2017 Total Scores and Rankings	6
2017 Scores by Indicator	34

FRAGILE STATES INDEX DECADE TRENDS

2007-2017 Decade Trends Map	38
2007-2017 Decade Change Rankings	40

METHODOLOGY

Overview of FSI Methodology	24
Indicators	
Cohesion	26
Economic	28
Political	30
Social	32
Cross-Cutting	33

ANALYSIS


Factionalization and Group Grievance	
Fuel Instability — <i>J.J. Messner</i>	8
"So Far From God, So Close to the United States":	
Mexico Most-Worsened — <i>George Lehner</i>	12
Golden Era of Growth Fails to Mask Deeper	
Grievances in Ethiopia — <i>Hannah Blyth</i>	13
From Attempted Coup to Attempted Autocracy:	
Instability in Turkey — <i>Amanda Quinn</i>	15
Falling Behind the Pack: Brazil Endures a Year	
of Self-Inflicted Troubles — <i>George Lehner</i>	16
Problems of the Rainbow Nation Viewed Across	
the Full Spectrum — <i>J.J. Messner</i>	17
And Now for Some Good News: Where the World	
Is Getting Better — <i>Daniel Ganz</i>	19
Colombia Enjoys a Peace Dividend After Half-	
Century of Conflict — <i>Christina Murphy</i>	21

FRAGILE STATES INDEX

COUNTRY ABBREVIATIONS

AE	U.A.E.	DJ	DJIBOUTI	LI	LITHUANIA
AL	ALBANIA	DK	DENMARK	LV	LATVIA
AM	ARMENIA	EE	ESTONIA	LX	LUXEMBOURG
AT	AUSTRIA	ER	ERITREA	ME	MONTENEGRO
AZ	AZERBAIJAN	GE	GEORGIA	MK	MACEDONIA
BA	BOSNIA & H.	GQ	EQ. GUINEA	MW	MALAWI
BD	BANGLADESH	GR	GREECE	NL	NETHERLANDS
BE	BELGIUM	HU	HUNGARY	QA	QATAR
BF	BURKINA FASO	HV	CROATIA	RS	SERBIA
BG	BULGARIA	IL	ISRAEL	RW	RWANDA
BH	BAHRAIN	JO	JORDAN	SG	SINGAPORE
BI	BURUNDI	KG	KYRGYZ REP.	SI	SLOVENIA
BT	BHUTAN	KH	CAMBODIA	SK	SLOVAKIA
CG	CONGO (REP.)	KW	KUWAIT	TJ	TAJIKISTAN
CY	CYPRUS	LA	LAOS	TN	TUNISIA
CZ	CZECH REP.	LB	LEBANON	UG	UGANDA

AE	U.A.E.	DJ	DJIBOUTI	LI	LITHUANIA
AL	ALBANIA	DK	DENMARK	LV	LATVIA
AM	ARMENIA	EE	ESTONIA	LX	LUXEMBOURG
AT	AUSTRIA	ER	ERITREA	ME	MONTENEGRO
AZ	AZERBAIJAN	GE	GEORGIA	MK	MACEDONIA
BA	BOSNIA & H.	GQ	EQ. GUINEA	MW	MALAWI
BD	BANGLADESH	GR	GREECE	NL	NETHERLANDS
BE	BELGIUM	HU	HUNGARY	QA	QATAR
BF	BURKINA FASO	HV	CROATIA	RS	SERBIA
BG	BULGARIA	IL	ISRAEL	RW	RWANDA
BH	BAHRAIN	JO	JORDAN	SG	SINGAPORE
BI	BURUNDI	KG	KYRGYZ REP.	SI	SLOVENIA
BT	BHUTAN	KH	CAMBODIA	SK	SLOVAKIA
CG	CONGO (REP.)	KW	KUWAIT	TJ	TAJIKISTAN
CY	CYPRUS	LA	LAOS	TN	TUNISIA
CZ	CZECH REP.	LB	LEBANON	UG	UGANDA





FRAGILE STATES INDEX: STATE FRAGILITY IN 2017

VERY STABLE	MORE STABLE	WARNING	ELEVATED WARNING
 18.7 Finland (178) ▲	 40.1 Czech Republic (152) ▲	 60.5 Albania (124) ▲	 70.0 Serbia (107) ▲
SUSTAINABLE	 40.8 Poland (151) ▼	 61.5 Grenada (123) ▲	 70.1 Cape Verde (106) ▲
 20.5 Norway (177) ▲	 41.1 Chile (150) ▲	 61.6 Brunei (122) ▲	 70.2 Vietnam (105) ▲
 21.1 Switzerland (176) ▲	 41.7 Lithuania (=148) ▲	 62.6 Cyprus (121) ▲	 70.3 Peru (104) ▲
 21.5 Denmark (175) =	 41.7 Mauritius (=148) ▲	 63.8 Botswana (120) ▼	 70.4 Namibia (103) ▲
 22.1 Sweden (174) ▲	 43.7 U.A.E. (147) ▲	 64.6 Cuba (119) ▲	 71.0 Armenia (102) ▼
 22.3 Australia (=172) ▲	 44.0 Qatar (146) ▲	 64.9 Bahrain (118) ▼	 71.2 Saudi Arabia (101) ▲
 22.3 Ireland (=172) ▲	 44.1 Costa Rica (145) ▲	 65.2 Jamaica (117) ▼	 71.3 Guyana (100) ▼
 22.5 Iceland (171) ▲	 44.3 Slovak Republic (144) ▲	 65.4 Malaysia (116) ▲	 71.6 Paraguay (99) ▲
 22.6 Canada (=169) ▲	 44.7 Estonia (143) ▼	 65.5 Belize (115) ▲	 72.0 Moldova (98) ▲
 22.6 New Zealand (=169) ▼	 45.2 Italy (142) ▼	 65.9 Suriname (114) ▲	 72.1 Sao Tome & Prin. (97) ▲
 23.4 Luxembourg (168) ▲	 46.4 Latvia (141) ▲	 65.9 Kazakhstan (113) ▲	 72.3 South Africa (96) ▼
 27.4 Netherlands (167) ▲	 48.2 Argentina (140) ▲	 66.1 Macedonia (112) ▲	 72.4 Belarus (95) ▲
 27.7 Austria (166) ▼	 49.6 Barbados (139) ▼	 67.1 Samoa (111) ▲	 72.9 Indonesia (94) ▲
 28.1 Germany (165) ▲	STABLE	 68.2 Brazil (110) ▼	 73.0 Bosnia & Herz. (93) ▲
 29.0 Portugal (164) ▲	 50.6 Croatia (138) ▲	 69.0 Dominican Rep. (109) ▲	 73.1 El Salvador (92) ▼
VERY STABLE	 50.7 Panama (137) ▲	 69.7 Ghana (108) ▲	 73.8 Gabon (91) ▼
 30.8 Belgium (163) ▼	 50.9 Romania (136) ▲		 74.0 Ukraine (90) ▲
 32.4 Slovenia (162) ▲	 52.0 Hungary (135) ▲		 74.2 Tunisia (89) ▲
 32.5 Singapore (161) ▲	 52.4 Bahamas (134) ▼		 74.3 Mexico (88) ▼
 33.2 United Kingdom (160) ▼	 52.5 Oman (133) ▼		
 33.5 France (159) ▲	 53.7 Bulgaria (132) =		
 35.6 United States (158) ▼	 54.8 Antigua & Barb. (131) ▲		
 36.8 Uruguay (157) ▼	 55.7 Montenegro (130) ▼		
 37.4 Japan (156) ▼	 56.7 Mongolia (=128) ▼		
 37.9 Spain (155) ▲	 56.7 Trinidad & Tob. (=128) ▲		
 38.1 South Korea (154) ▼	 57.5 Greece (127) ▼		
38.6 Malta (153) ▲	58.5 Kuwait (126) =		
	59.4 Seychelles (125) ▲		

ELEVATED WARNING	HIGH WARNING	ALERT	HIGH ALERT
 74.4 Maldives (=86) ▼	 80.3 Kyrgyz Rep. (=65) ▲	 90.5 Timor-Leste (35) ▲	 101.1 Ethiopia (15) ▼
 74.4 Turkmenistan (=86) ▲	 80.3 Tanzania (=65) ▲	 90.8 Rwanda (34) ▲	 101.6 Nigeria (=13) ▲
 74.7 China (85) ▲	 80.8 Turkey (64) ▼	 91.0 Nepal (33) ▲	 101.6 Zimbabwe (=13) ▼
 74.9 Morocco (84) ▼	 81.5 Uzbekistan (63) ▲	 91.1 Angola (32) ▼	 102.4 Guinea (12) ▲
 76.0 Bhutan (83) ▲	 81.7 Lesotho (62) ▼	 92.9 Mali (31) ▲	 105.3 Haiti (11) ▼
 76.2 Thailand (82) ▲	 81.8 Tajikistan (61) ▲	 93.3 North Korea (30) ▲	 105.4 Iraq (10) ▼
 76.3 Azerbaijan (81) =	 82.3 Senegal (60) ▲	 93.4 Congo (Rep.) (29) ▼	 107.3 Afghanistan (9) ▲
 76.4 Micronesia (80) ▲	 82.4 Laos (59) ▲	 93.7 Mauritania (28) ▲	 109.4 Chad (8) ▲
 76.5 Georgia (79) ▲	 82.9 Venezuela (58) ▼	 93.8 Liberia (27) ▲	 110.0 Congo (D. R.) (7) =
 76.8 Algeria (77) ▲	 83.1 Guatemala (57) ▲	 95.6 Cameroon (26) ▲	VERY HIGH ALERT
 76.8 Bolivia (78) ▲	 83.9 Togo (56) ▲	 95.7 Myanmar (25) ▲	 110.6 Sudan (=5) ▲
 76.9 Fiji (76) ▼	 84.0 Madagascar (55) ▲	 96.0 Uganda (24) ▲	 110.6 Syria (=5) ▲
 77.3 Ecuador (75) ▼	 84.4 Philippines (54) ▲	 96.3 Libya (23) ▲	 111.1 Yemen (4) ▲
 77.4 Nicaragua (74) ▲	 84.8 Comoros (=52) ▼	 96.4 Kenya (22) ▲	 112.6 Central African R. (3) ▼
 77.6 Benin (73) ▲	 84.8 Solomon Is. (=52) ▲	 96.5 Cote d'Ivoire (21) ▲	 113.4 Somalia (2) ▲
 77.9 India (72) ▲	 85.0 Eq. Guinea (51) ▲	 97.4 Niger (20) ▲	 113.9 South Sudan (1) ▼
 78.7 Jordan (71) ▼	 85.7 Cambodia (50) ▲	 98.1 Eritrea (19) ▲	
 78.9 Colombia (=69) ▲	 85.8 Iran (49) ▲	 98.9 Pakistan (18) ▲	
 78.9 Israel/W. Bank (=69) ▲	 86.4 Papua N. Guinea (48) ▼	 98.9 Burundi (17) ▲	
 79.1 Honduras (68) ▲	 86.6 Sri Lanka (47) ▲	 99.5 Guinea Bissau (16) ▲	
 79.2 Russia (67) ▲	 87.8 Zambia (46) ▼		
	 88.0 Burkina Faso (=44) ▲		
	 88.0 Malawi (=44) ▼		
	 88.2 Lebanon (43) ▲		
	 88.8 Swaziland (42) ▼		
	 88.9 Djibouti (41) ▲		
	 89.0 Mozambique (40) ▼		
	 89.1 Bangladesh (39) ▲		
	 89.3 Sierra Leone (38) ▲		
	 89.4 Gambia (37) ▼		
	 89.8 Egypt (36) ▲		

FACTIONALIZATION AND GROUP GRIEVANCE FUEL RISE IN INSTABILITY

J. J. MESSNER

Though **South Sudan** has returned to top position on the annual Fragile States Index (FSI) for 2017, and **Finland** continues to maintain its position as the world's least fragile country, the global tumult of the past year has been borne out in the Index's trend analysis, as Ethiopia, Mexico, and Turkey recorded the greatest worsening over 2016. A number of developed countries also recorded notable worsening scores across certain indicators, in particular the United States and the United Kingdom, which both experienced highly divisive political campaigns during 2016. The long-term trends of the FSI have also raised red flags on a number of countries – in particular South Africa and Senegal – for which the conditions that could precipitate instability have worsened significantly.

The FSI, now in its thirteenth year, is an assessment of 178 countries based on twelve social, economic, and political indicators that quantifies pressures experienced by countries, and thus their susceptibility to instability. The FSI itself is based on the CAST conflict assessment framework, a methodology developed a quarter of a century ago that continues to be implemented widely by policymakers, field practitioners, and local communities in better understanding the drivers of conflict. The FSI, adapted from the CAST framework, is assessed through a process that triangulates content analysis of over 50 million data points, with quantitative data sets and qualitative research validation.

MOST WORSENEO COUNTRIES IN 2017

Much attention has been directed at **Turkey** recently, not only because of its pivotal geographical position in proximity to the war in Syria, but also because of its continued slide into instability and authoritarianism. The FSI data demonstrates that, since 2011, Turkey has worsened significantly across a range of indicators, declining in its overall score by 10 points over that period. Though the country has experienced increased pressure driven by refugee flows from Syria, much of the worsening has been driven by social and

political indicators, in particular Group Grievance, Human Rights, State Legitimacy, Factionalized Elites, and Security Apparatus. Turkey was the third most worsened country since 2016, in no small part due to the attempted coup in July. In the aftermath, Turkey witnessed a major crackdown on political opponents and journalists. Beyond the attempted coup, a series of terrorist attacks, as well as renewed tensions with the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, has increased the pressures experienced by Turkey. Given that the highly controversial constitutional referendum staged in April 2017 – and its divisive lead-up – was not recorded in the 2017 FSI, the outlook for Turkey in 2018 remains poor.

Limited attention has been given to outbreaks of violence in **Ethiopia**, as anti-government protests, particularly in the Amhara and Oromia regions, led to a declaration of a state of emergency in October 2016. The state of emergency was also used as a tool to crackdown on political opponents and media. An estimated 400 people have been killed in clashes with security forces in Oromia alone. The increased pressure in 2017 marks a continuation of a long-term worsening trend for Ethiopia, whose score has increased from 91.9 in 2006 to a high of 101.1 in 2017. At the root of some of the increased pressure in Ethiopia are issues that can be traced to climate risks, as the country faces significant drought conditions and pressures on the food supply; further, competition over, and displacement from, grazing land was attributed as an underlying cause of the violence surrounding the planned annexation of land by the city of Addis Ababa as the government sought to expand its boundaries into neighboring Oromia. These pressures are borne out in the fact that Ethiopia's highest indicator score, 9.8, was recorded for Demographic Pressures; interestingly all three of Ethiopia's worst indicators are social indicators, pointing to added pressure from Group Grievance and Refugees and IDPs.

Mexico was a constant target of scorn in a highly charged U.S. Presidential campaign, and it was also the equally most worsened country since 2016. However, this score bucks a

generally improving long-term trend for Mexico. After recording a high score of 76.1 in 2010, Mexico had improved by over 5 points to 70.4 in 2016, meaning that the 2017 score runs counter to that long-term trend. Much of the additional pressure has been driven by a surge in violence, with the highest number of homicides being recorded in 2012, as well as high-profile cases of organized crime that included the abduction of 43 students in Guerrero. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Security Apparatus indicator remains Mexico's worst, though the rising pressure on Group Grievance and State Legitimacy is a cause for concern, particularly as Uneven Economic Development is also worsening at a similar rate.

Also recording significantly worsened year-on-year scores were three other countries that experienced significant turmoil during 2016 – Brazil, The Gambia, and South Africa.

Brazil experienced a year of immense political turmoil during 2016, as President Dilma Roussef was impeached. Brazil had recorded an impressive trend of improvement through 2014, before turning the opposite direction and displaying a sharp worsening trend over the past four years. The political turmoil has reflected an economic crisis that became a very public issue as the state of Rio de Janeiro declared a state of financial emergency only weeks prior to the Olympic Games, with further protests across the country against austerity policies put in place as a response to the economic crisis. Brazil's political and economic crises have been further compounded by an increase in crime and the effects on public health of the outbreak of the Zika virus.

The Gambia had largely flown under the radar for much of the world's media until the disputed election of December 2016 when Yahya Jammeh, who had been President for over 20 years, lost unexpectedly to Adama Barrow, sparking a crisis when Jammeh first accepted, then rejected the result. Though the crisis was eventually resolved by ECOWAS in early 2017 – an action that will likely be picked up in the 2018 FSI – the long-term trends in the FSI demonstrated that this instability was a long anticipated. The Gambia is the eighth-most worsened country of the past decade, and has worsened in almost every year since the beginning of the FSI, with State Legitimacy and Human Rights worsening over the long-term, but Factionalized Elites and Group Grievance sharply increasing immediately ahead of the elections. It is likely that the sharp uptick in the latter two indicators reflects the largely unprecedented widespread protests in the lead-up to the December 2016 vote.

MOST WORSENEDE COUNTRIES IN 2017

 +3.9 Ethiopia (101.1) 	 +1.8 Gabon (73.8) 
 +3.9 Mexico (74.3) 	 +1.7 Ecuador (77.3) 
 +3.5 Turkey (80.8) 	 +1.6 Greece (57.5) 
 +2.9 Brazil (68.2) 	 +1.6 United States (35.6) 
 +2.6 The Gambia (89.4) 	 +1.5 Bahrain (64.9) 
 +2.4 South Africa (72.3) 	 +1.5 Zambia (97.8) 
 +2.3 Japan (37.4) 	 +1.4 Armenia (71.0) 
 +2.1 Italy (45.2) 	 +1.3 Estonia (44.7) 
 +2.0 South Korea (38.1) 	 +1.3 New Zealand (22.6) 
 +1.8 Belgium (30.8) 	 +1.3 Venezuela (82.9) 

South Africa's trend is particularly alarming. As the economic engine – and in many respects, the political giant – of Africa, the FSI has tracked a rapid decline in the country over the past decade, with only Libya, Syria, Yemen, Mali, and Senegal having worsened more in the past ten years. In 2006, the FSI assessed South Africa at 55.7, within the Stable category. Now, in 2017, South Africa finds itself at 72.3, within the Elevated Warning category, and has been surpassed by both Ghana and Botswana, which are now the most stable countries on the continent. In the past year, the country has experienced increasing economic pressure that has been a major driver of strikes, protests, and political instability, that has crystalized into the growing calls for President Jacob Zuma – who is also embroiled in scandal – to step down.

Fragility is certainly not confined to developing countries – among the ten most worsened countries in 2017 were Japan, Italy, South Korea, and Belgium, with the United States not far behind as the 14th most worsened.

Belgium experienced a serious terrorist attack in March 2016, and this has further fueled controversy over refugee flows into the country. Notably, this is reflected in the Security Apparatus, Group Grievance, and Refugees indicators being among those that sharply worsened over the past year.

Italy had begun to show signs of improvement in recent years, however the combination of significant earthquakes, continued pressure from refugee flows, and in particular tensions surrounding the failed constitutional referendum

and the resignation of Prime Minister Matteo Renzi all served to undermine Italy's performance in the 2017 FSI.

Japan had demonstrated an improving trend in recent years following the earthquake and nuclear disaster at Fukushima in 2011. However, increasing Demographic Pressures, coupled with a continuing increase in educated Japanese leaving the country, as well as further serious natural disasters – including a typhoon and two major earthquakes – are contributing to Japan's worsened performance.

Though **South Korea** has been experiencing an economic slowdown, in many ways it is possible to attribute the significant worsening of South Korea in 2017 on one person – disgraced former president Park Guen-hye. President Park's incredible story of corruption and influence peddling with the daughter of a cult leader rocked South Korea, leading to widespread protests and eventual impeachment by parliament, has served to destabilize the country.

The **United States** has worsened in 2017 despite the majority of its indicators actually improving. Based on the FSI analysis, the United States has recorded long-term economic improvements and – perhaps remarkably, given recent coverage – improvements in political indicators such as State Legitimacy, Public Services, Human Rights, and Refugees. However, these broad improvements have been severely undermined by sharp upticks in three key indicators – Group Grievance, Factionalized Elites, and Security Apparatus. The severe worsening of the Group Grievance and Factionalized Elites indicators can be attributed in part to the highly divisive presidential election campaign in 2016, and in particular the tone of the campaign that tended to focus substantially on societal wedge issues, some of which had racial undertones. Interestingly, these indicators tracked very closely with those of the **United Kingdom**, which experienced its own highly divisive campaign during 2016 on exiting the European Union. It is unclear which of these precipitates the other – whether divisive rhetoric causes increased societal divisions, or campaigns based on such rhetoric take advantage of pre-existing conditions of deep division, or both. Regardless, the United Kingdom and the United States provide somewhat of a warning, that even where the majority of indicators may be improving, a handful of specific key indicators trending in the opposite direction can have profound effects on a country's ultimate performance and implications for stability.

MOST IMPROVED COUNTRIES IN 2017

 -2.8 Pakistan (98.9) 	 -2.0 Tajikistan (81.8) 
 -2.6 Thailand (76.2) 	 -2.0 Uzbekistan (81.5) 
 -2.5 Panama (50.7) 	 -1.9 Kenya (96.4) 
 -2.4 Georgia (76.5) 	 -1.9 Nigeria (101.6) 
 -2.3 Mali (92.9) 	 -1.9 Spain (37.9) 
 -2.2 Cameroon (95.6) 	 -1.9 Togo (83.9) 
 -2.0 Indonesia (72.9) 	 -1.8 Burundi (98.9) 
 -2.0 Laos (82.4) 	 -1.8 Croatia (50.6) 
 -2.0 Romania (50.9) 	 -1.8 Dom. Rep. (69.0) 
 -2.0 Serbia (70.0) 	 -1.8 Russia (79.2) 

MOST IMPROVED COUNTRIES IN 2017

At the other end of the trend analysis for the past year, **Pakistan** recorded the most significant improvement of any country in 2017. However, in analyzing the improvement of any country year-on-year, it is important to understand that improvement within the context of longer-term trends. A country's year-on-year improvement will tend to fall into one of two categories – either a “bounce back”, where a country is not so much improving but rather recovering from a shock that might have worsened its score in previous years (in other words, the country is not necessarily performing well, but simply less badly than last year); or, sustainable improvement, where the country's improvement is another step forward on a long-term trend of decreasing fragility and increasing stability. In the case of Pakistan, it would appear that there have been some important improvements – for example on economic indicators and even security indicators – however, whether this signifies a trend is less clear, particularly as the Group Grievance indicator continues to rise, counter to the country's overall performance.

Among the other most improved countries for 2017, **Georgia, Indonesia, Laos, Panama, Romania, Serbia, and Uzbekistan** all continued to improve in accordance with trends over the past decade that demonstrate clear, long-term sustainable improvement. Though Thailand, Mali, and Cameroon were also among the most improved for the year, their longer-term trends suggest that improvements over the past year are more likely “bounce backs” from earlier shocks rather than evidence that overall pressures in those countries are decreasing.

LONG-TERM DECADE TRENDS


Cuba remains the most improved country of the past 10 years, as the government has instituted economic reforms – as well as some limited political reforms – and has significantly opened up to the outside world, in particular normalizing relations with the United States. Among the other most improved countries are the constituent states of the former Yugoslavia (**Bosnia & Herzegovina**, **Serbia**, **Croatia**, and **Macedonia** are all among the Top 30 most improved) as well as former Soviet states (7 of the Top 40 most improved), demonstrating a clear post-conflict (or post-Cold War) peace dividend for those countries. Other notable improvements within the Top 20 Most Significantly Improved over the past decade include **Colombia**, where the level of stability has rapidly consolidated as the decades-long internal conflict with the FARC has come to an end; **Germany**, where despite the economic and social pressures wracking many of its neighbors, has managed to improve significantly in spite of those pressures; and **Indonesia**, as the world's largest Muslim-majority nation is the 9th most improved country, driven by economic development and increasing political stability.

Meanwhile, of the most worsened countries of the past decade there are likely few surprises at the very top – but equally a number of countries whose performance should herald a strong warning. Though the four most critically worsened for the decade – **Libya**, **Syria**, **Yemen**, and **Mali** – are likely obvious candidates, a number of other countries that have worsened significantly – such as **Senegal**, **Eritrea**, **Mozambique**, **Central African Republic**, and **Guinea-Bissau** – receive little attention in the world's media. It is worth recognizing that the FSI had been tracking the significant worsening trend of The Gambia ahead of the political crisis at the end of 2016, and has similarly been tracking the worsening trend of South Africa ahead of the growing civil unrest there that is beginning to gain broader international attention now.

... BUT LET'S ALSO NOT FORGET THE RANKINGS

Any index inherently ranks different countries, making some more fragile than others. Though we attempt as much as possible to focus more on the short- and long-term trends and specific indicator fluctuations within the FSI, the rankings are nonetheless informative in understanding where severe fragility continues to persist.

MOST WORSENEDEST COUNTRY TRENDS



The most fragile states topping the index this year remain relatively unchanged. **South Sudan** returned to the number one spot, amid deepening food insecurity, ongoing conflict between supporters of President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar, reports of ethnic cleansing, and suspended elections. **Somalia** took second place, improving slightly from last year as battle-related deaths dropped as part of the ongoing conflict with al-Shabaab; though it still faces ongoing state pressures with insecurity, poverty and state legitimacy. The remaining countries in the Very High Alert category of the 2017 FSI include **Central African Republic**, **Yemen**, **Sudan** and **Syria** – all of which face different cycles of conflict and violence, leading to weak governance and levels of external intervention.

* * *

Though the FSI does not predict unrest or turmoil, it does provide early warning of the conditions that can likely give rise to instability. To that end, the short and long-term trends suggest that policymakers and practitioners should be mindful of the growing potential for the conditions of further instability in those countries and recognize that if a shock of some variety were to occur – from a natural disaster to a recession to localized communal violence – that such events in any of these countries could have dire consequences given the pre-existing conditions of fragility.

“SO FAR FROM GOD, SO CLOSE TO THE UNITED STATES.” MEXICO MOST-WORSENEED IN 2017

GEORGE LEHNER

It has been a tough year for Mexico. As Mexico has borne the brunt of combative political rhetoric from north of the border, the country has also weathered economic and political challenges, as well as an uptick of violence. The first weeks of 2017 saw widespread protests throughout Mexico, a sign that the problems that have plagued this country for last several years are continuing, a manifestation of the pressures that saw Mexico tied as the equal most worsened country on the 2017 Fragile States Index (FSI).

In 10 of the 12 FSI indicators, Mexico showed a decline, moving its total score by 3.9 points, a significant change over the prior year. Most notably, Mexico worsened in the Security Apparatus, Economic Decline, Refugees & IDP's, and Group Grievance indicators. Though the economy continued to grow slightly, the overall economic outlook in Mexico, and its ability to sustain meaningful economic progress, was clouded by doubt. This was largely due to fluctuating oil prices and the uncertainty of the impact of the U.S. election on U.S.-Mexican relations.

More troubling than Mexico's economic performance, however, was the widespread corruption and outbreaks of violent crime that have continued to plague the country without any real sign of abatement. In 2016, across the country dozens of local officials were threatened or killed; during the mid-term parliamentary election, seven candidates were murdered and many more dropped out, citing threats to their safety if they remained in the running. The source of the violence, sometimes perpetuated by criminal cartels, or attributed to public security forces acting with impunity, contributes to undermine trust in the rule of law and perceptions of personal security. This is mirrored in downward FSI indicator scores for the and Group Grievance indicators.

Whether Mexico is able to address these systemic problems will most likely remain an open question at least until next presidential election slated for 2018. President Enrique Peña

MEXICO: LONG-TERM FSI TRENDLINE



Nieto is limited to one term, and already the election year jockeying is underway. Mexico is likely to face a stark choice when it votes in the next election – whether to move further left, undoing some of the pro-market and pro-growth strategies that were undertaken by Nieto or to stick with a more tough, anti-corruption but pro-growth, pro-trade program. A move to the left will certainly put Mexico on a collision course with the U.S. and the current incumbent, increasing economic uncertainty for the next Mexican administration. Mexico is already seeing a significant economic impact, largely attributed to the results of the US election, as the peso has plunged to new and dramatic lows against the dollar in the last several months.

Though Mexico tied for most worsened country in 2017, it is yet to be seen whether this forms part of a more worrying long-term trend. After all, up until now, Mexico had actually been improving over the past decade. Though Mexico clearly has domestic challenges of its own, the U.S. relations with Mexico will likely have a heavy impact on its direction going forward over the short term, or as captured once by former Mexican leader Porfirio Diaz: “Poor Mexico, so far from God and so close to the United States.”

GOLDEN ERA OF GROWTH FAILS TO MASK DEEPER GRIEVANCES IN ETHIOPIA


HANNAH BLYTH

Since the end of an almost two-decades long civil war that began in 1991, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has provided relative political stability and enabled strong economic development. Though an inter-state conflict with Eritrea over disputed territory flared in 1998-2000, since the ceasefire was declared between the two countries in December 2000, Ethiopia has been on a path of strong fiscal growth and has become an increasingly respected player within the international community. Ethiopia's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has risen from US\$8.2 billion in 2000, to an impressive US\$61.5 billion in 2015 – coinciding with major injections of foreign capital from development partners. Looking past these golden dollar sign headlines, however, there are signals that deep social and political fissures have the potential to set the country back on a path to conflict.

Ethiopia's overall Fragile States Index (FSI) score has been incrementally worsening over the past decade, moving from 95.3 in 2007, to a score of 101.1 in this year's 2017 index, with Ethiopia — along with Mexico — being the most-worsened country over the past year.

Some of this can be attributed to External Intervention, with its FSI score moving from 6.7 in 2007 to 8.7 in 2017, making it Ethiopia's most worsened indicator overall for the decade. In 2000, Ethiopia received US\$687.8 million in Official Development Assistance (ODA).¹ By 2015, it had risen to over four times this with US\$3.23 billion in ODA, mostly from the U.S., World Bank and European partners focused on social infrastructure and humanitarian aid.² While this suggests low capacity of the state to plan and respond to natural disasters without external aid, arguably this development funding has also been crucial in stimulating the rapid economic trajectory of the country. Ethiopia's economic indicators have both made improvements over the past decade, with FSI scores for Uneven Economic Development shifting from 8.6 in 2007 to 6.5 in 2017, and Poverty & Economic Decline from 8.0 in 2007 to 7.0 in 2017. While the economic trajectory tells one

ETHIOPIA: KEY INDICATORS



part of the story, the gap in public services between the urban areas such as bustling Addis Ababa, and rural areas — where 81% of the population still live³ — hint at growing disparities. The country's Public Services score in the FSI has worsened from 7.0 in 2007 to 8.8 in 2017 — much of this is due to poor access to internet and communications, as well as limited improvements in water and sanitation facilities within the county.⁴ Health infrastructure also remains weak in many areas, with only 15% of births attended by a skilled health professional, and just 0.02 Doctors per 1,000 people within the populous country.⁵ The highly centralized nature of the EPRDF means that the nine ethno-linguistic regions of Ethiopia have limited power and resources for provision of public services. The military also plays an active role in reinforcing the centralized development agenda — with much of the country's development driven via the military-



controlled conglomerate Metals, Engineering Corporation (METEC). As a 2016 report by Dutch think tank Clingendael surmised, this increases risks of “corruption, nepotism and inefficient resource allocation,”⁶ all of which can increase the disconnect between development and rural populations.

Compounding these growing disparities between rural populations and economic growth are complex political and ethnic tensions. The historical influence of the Tigray ethnic group – which accounts for about 6% of the population – has been evident since the Ethiopian empire, and reinforced after the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) defeated the Ethiopian government in 1991. The TPLF transitioned into the multi-party EPRDF, though Tigray elites are perceived to still hold significant political power within the essentially one-party state. Military leadership has also been dominated by Tigrayans,⁷ which makes perceptions of Tigray influence within the state apparatus all the more unpalatable to populations that feel increasingly excluded.

It is amidst this climate that major protests and violence have erupted against the government in Oromia and Amhara regions – home to the two largest ethnic groups in Ethiopia. Beginning in November 2015, Oromians began protesting the government’s planned expansion of the capital Addis Ababa into Oromia. Spiraling into a broader fight for increased political freedoms, representation and economic and land rights, the protests were met with brutal crack-downs by public security forces. Reflecting these dynamic factors, Ethiopia has seen negative spikes in its FSI score from 2016 to 2017 in Group Grievance, Human Rights and Rule of Law and State Legitimacy. Human Rights Watch suggests that more than 500 people have been killed during the government demonstrations in 2016, as well as reported incidents of arbitrary detention, torture, and media repression aided by the government’s State of Emergency declared in October 2016.⁸

While ethnicity remains a politicized factor within Ethiopia – and salient driver of group grievance for populations who feel excluded – it is useful to remember that conflict and violence operates within a system. Issues related to land tenure, access to resources, and economic exclusion can also be contributing drivers for the current insecurity. This is also complicated by ongoing demographic pressures

resulting from floods and drought, and flows of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) from natural disasters, the effects of climate change, and neighboring countries’ insecurity. Indeed, the FSI score for Refugees & IDPs has steadily worsened over the past decade from 7.9 in 2007 to 9.3 in 2017.

Ethiopia’s centralized government control has served it well for economic growth and rebuilding after the civil war and conflict with Eritrea – as well as maintaining control of the security apparatus amidst neighboring conflicts and regional instability. However, as worsening FSI scores show through both a longer-term trajectory, and recent 2017 spikes, the country must change course to strengthen internal social and economic resiliency. The recent spate of protests and insecurity in areas such as Oromia and Amhara demonstrate the need for political reform – both in perceptions of ethnic elite power – and in more meaningful political representation of each region. This will help to address the disparities in public service provisions that are adding to group grievance and feelings of exclusion. A less centralized approach will also help build governance capacities at regional and local levels – which will support rural development, and provide a chance for better targeted planning and response for natural disasters. As the fourth largest ODA recipient country in 2015, international partners should also continue to play an encouraging role in Ethiopia’s reform, including expansion of civil liberties which will reduce group grievance and increase the perceived legitimacy of the state.

Through addressing the conflict risks and structural vulnerabilities within the country, Ethiopia has a chance to continue a path of peaceful prosperity and even greater economic growth and development.

ENDNOTES

1. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD>
2. <http://www.oecd.org/statistics/datalab/oda-recipient-sector.htm>
3. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS>
4. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.ACSN.RU>; <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.H2O.SAFE.RU.ZS>
5. <http://datatopics.worldbank.org/hnp/>
6. https://www.clingendael.nl/pub/2016/power_politics_and_security_in_ethiopia/executive_summary/
7. Regime Change and Succession Politics in Africa; Jan Zanhrik (2009) <https://books.google.com/books?id=Gow8JDgeZSoC>
8. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/ethiopia>



FROM ATTEMPTED COUP TO ATTEMPTED AUTOCRACY: A YEAR OF INSTABILITY IN TURKEY


AMANDA QUINN

Bordered by eight countries and situated between Europe and Asia, Turkey has been affected by geopolitical forces on multiple fronts. In recent years, a combination of internal and external pressures has pushed the country into challenging times, especially throughout 2016. Turkey's overall score on the 2017 Fragile States Index worsened by 3.5 points from its score on the 2016 Index, its most drastic change since 2012, and also making Turkey the third-most worsened country on the FSI over the past year, behind only Ethiopia and Mexico. Between an attempted military coup, multiple major terrorist attacks, continued spillover from the crisis in Syria, and an increasingly authoritarian government, it is impossible to pinpoint a single driver of Turkey's growing instability.

At the center of Turkey's shaky domestic and geopolitical situation is President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Increasingly, Erdogan's leadership has been described as autocratic, with parallels being drawn with the leadership style (and tactics) of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Confronted with a challenging security and political environment, Erdogan has been solidifying his hold on power by steering the government toward an executive presidency, essentially leaving the power of his office unchecked. In May, Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu abruptly resigned from his position amid dissension over Erdogan's consolidation of power.

In July 2016, an attempted military coup d'état carried out by a faction within the Turkish Armed Forces led to intense political pressure and a tightening of government control across the country. In the months following, thousands of soldiers and judges were detained, and the country's major newspaper was brought under state control. Erdogan also placed the country in a state of emergency, giving himself extensive powers, such as the ability to bypass parliament when drafting laws. Government institutions checking the president's power were already breaking down and the attempted coup gave Erdogan an excuse to further stretch his power. Erdogan accused Fethullah Gülen, leader of the Gülen movement, of being behind the violent coup. The

TURKEY: KEY INDICATORS



Gülen movement is an Islamic religious movement that emerged in the 1970s in opposition to secularism. Though Erdogan and Gülen were once allies, the relationship has long since broken down, and in 2015, the Gülenist movement was classified as a terrorist organization within Turkey. Erdogan's accusation has led to the arbitrary detention of at least 2,200 judges and prosecutors by accusing them of involvement with the Gülenists despite a lack of evidence in most cases. Additionally, over 100,000 public officials and civil servants were dismissed from their positions.

Turkey's tenuous security situation has also been a driver of the country's increasing fragility. Its Security Apparatus score worsened by 0.5 to 8.3 from an already poor score of

CONTINUED ON PAGE 18



FALLING BEHIND THE PACK: BRAZIL ENDURES A DIFFICULT YEAR OF SELF-INFLICTED TROUBLES

GEORGE LEHNER

Brazil showed a significant decline in the 2017 FSI, becoming the fourth most worsened country since 2016, largely as a result of a devastating recession, continued fallout from widespread political corruption probes, and the impeachment of its President. Overall, Brazil worsened by 2.9 points on its total score compared to the prior year.

In nine of the twelve measures of fragility, Brazil's performance worsened markedly, dropping most notably in the areas of Group Grievance, Demographic Pressures, and Public Services. The three-year trend line demonstrates similar levels of declines across eight of the twelve indicators, with notable changes in the Security Apparatus, the Economy, and Public Service indicators.

While Brazil received considerable international attention in 2016 as a result of hosting the Summer Olympics, the Games were often overshadowed by the deepening political crisis that saw President Rousseff impeached in August 2016. Indeed, the governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro declared a state of financial emergency only weeks before the Games. Moreover, it was impossible to ignore the rising unemployment rate as it spiked over the course of the year, and the fall of GDP as it tumbled by 7%.

Equally apparent to Brazil's citizens was the sharp decline in public services, particularly in the education and health sectors, a fact underlined by the failure of the state of Rio de Janeiro to pay its public sector workers for a significant period of time due to the lack of government funds. As a result — and predictably — Group Grievance has continued to rise as almost all levels of society have felt the impact of both a more fragile political climate and significant economic decline.

Brazil's increasing measure of fragility, first evident in 2014, began after a five year period where it was viewed, along with Russia, India, China, and South Africa, as one of the new and emerging engines of growth and prosperity for the 21st

century. As a review of the FSI's ten-year trend numbers demonstrates, starting in 2009, Brazil began to show steady and significant year-to-year improvement as measured by the FSI indicators. Those trends were particularly marked in the areas of Group Grievance, Human Flight & Brain Drain, External Intervention, and the Economy.

However, that trend not only has slowed down but quickly reversed course. Falling oil prices and overall global economic slowdown took hold in 2014/2015, hitting Brazil particularly hard. These events were exacerbated by the political instability that erupted after President Rousseff's election to a second term in October 2014. Their collective impact shook Brazil and the country began to feel the kind of pressures that challenge a state's ability to respond to social and economic needs of a rapidly growing population. The FSI data strongly suggest that the rapid economic growth that characterized Brazil in the 2009-2014 period was not accompanied by similar strengthening of state and civil institutions. Lack of transparency, increased corruption at the highest levels, a rapid expansion of an over-burdened, under funded public service sector, and a failure to address growing wealth disparity, all combined to undermine state legitimacy just as the economic slow down took shape. As various sectors of Brazilian society push for an increased share of a shrinking economic pie, regional tensions have risen as well, as reflected, in part, by a 5% rise, in the last year, of the Group Grievance indicator.

Despite the economic and political setbacks of the last several years, Brazil has Latin America's largest economy at \$1.35 trillion. It possesses significant and untapped natural resources, and its fundamental government institutions have withstood significant challenges. Continuing to build confidence in the government's ability (at the federal and state) level to deliver basic public services, even as the economy begins a slow recovery, will be crucial to Brazil's ability to build the kind of state resilience necessary for the Brazil's long-term success.



PROBLEMS OF THE RAINBOW NATION VIEWED ACROSS THE FULL SPECTRUM

J.J. MESSNER

Over the past decade, the Rainbow Nation has also traversed much of the color spectrum on the Fragile States Index (FSI) map. Though our color palette is simply representative of a country's score – green to blue for the most stable, yellow to deep red for the most fragile – the changing colors of South Africa on that map during the past decade has served as a stark visual demonstration of the country's rapid decline. From the bright green of (relative) Stability in 2007 through to the yellow-orange of the Warning category in 2017 – as the country faces social, economic, and political turmoil.

It is important to contextualize just how far South Africa has declined over the past decade. In 2007, the FSI ranked South Africa at 132nd on a score of 57.4; in 2017, South Africa has rocketed up the rankings to 96th position, on a score of 72.3. Of all 178 countries that FSI assesses, South Africa is the sixth most worsened country over the past decade. To be even clearer, with the exception of Senegal, South Africa is the most worsened country not in active conflict or civil war.

South Africa's decline on the FSI has been driven by a number of different indicators. Over the long term, the Economic Decline indicator, in worsening from 2.8 in 2007 to 7.1 in 2017, has reflected the severe economic challenges facing the country. What should worry South Africa the most is that the Group Grievance, State Legitimacy, and Security Apparatus indicators have recently spiked, along with a renewed worsening of the Factionalized Elites indicator. This suggests that both the country's leadership as well as the population as a whole are dangerously fragmenting, and rapidly so.

There are a number of drivers behind South Africa's performance, but they are all largely related to economic challenges, societal divisions, and fractured leadership. What they all have in common is an underlying interest in preservation of the status quo and diversion of attention away from the actual drivers of the country's woes.

SOUTH AFRICA: KEY INDICATORS



First and foremost is South Africa's poor economic performance, as borne out in the FSI economic indicator scores. Though technically the largest economy on the continent, with enormous resources, and at a time when a market as large as South Africa's should be booming, the country is managing growth around 1%. With a sluggish economy and an official unemployment rate of around 25% (that is thought to be unofficially closer to 50% for sections of the population), economically-fueled tensions will only likely increase. Rather than taking steps to boost the economy, President Zuma recently fired the widely respected Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan, and has begun to promise radical economic transformation, including land distribution, that worryingly echoes the past experience of Zimbabwe.

Exacerbating the economic troubles are the pervasive racial divides within South Africa, wherein stark economic disparities persist between the white and black populations, as the wealth and opportunity gap of uneven economic development has widened for many of South Africa's poorest. This has been made worse by poor public service delivery, wherein those South Africans with the means to do



so procure private alternatives to otherwise public services (from education to security), while those without the same means go without those services. Racial scapegoating has also served as a means for blaming the economy's ills on "rich white capitalists" rather than on governmental mismanagement of the economy or failure to provide basic services.

But ultimately, South Africa is facing a crisis of leadership. Recently, there has been a sharp uptick in vocal opposition towards President Jacob Zuma particularly for his handling of the economy. But the rot has set in much deeper. Much of what the Factionalized Elites score is detecting is a zero-sum approach to dealing with opposition and critics of the African National Congress' (ANC) leadership. Rather than addressing the country's economic woes, crumbling education system, or the persistent racial divides, the Zuma government has instead been consumed by factional infighting – and that is apart from Zuma's pursuit of policies that have benefitted his allies, or even himself personally. When there is a recognition of the country's challenges, the ANC has remained largely united, choosing party unity over any attempt at fixing the country's ills, and instead resorting to xenophobic attacks and scapegoating against foreigners in an attempt to divert attention from the domestic causes of the country's rapid decay.

As the memory of the courageous freedom fighters of the

apartheid era becomes increasingly distant for a new generation of South Africans, expectations of what government needs to provide – in terms of jobs, opportunity, and public services – will rise, unencumbered by the nostalgia of the fight for freedom. This tension has already been borne out by the recent protests and rioting at universities throughout South Africa, as students have become increasingly frustrated at an education system that leaves them ill-prepared for well-paying professions, again exacerbating the opportunity and wealth gap within the country as those with means will still continue to be well placed to seek private alternatives and thus be better placed to qualify for highly skilled – and better paid – work. But as has been witnessed in countless other countries, large swathes of frustrated youth who feel bereft of opportunity can lead to highly volatile socio-political conditions.

South Africa was once a great hope for the continent, and its decline over the past decade should cause alarm both within the country and also regionally. For Africa as a whole to continue to develop, it will rely on regional economic powerhouses, like South Africa. Equally, it provided an inspiration for a continent, of democratic and pluralist governance. As the country's economy stagnates, inequality grows, and politicians continue to bicker and scapegoat rather than address the country's underlying problems, the prognosis for South Africa will remain worrisome.

FROM ATTEMPTED COUP TO ATTEMPTED AUTOCRACY: A YEAR OF INSTABILITY IN TURKEY

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 15

7.8 in the 2016 Index. Several major terrorist attacks shook the country over the course of the year, including an attack on Istanbul's Atatürk Airport in June and a shooting at a city nightclub on New Year's Eve. Additionally, the government's relationship with its Kurdish population remains ever-complicated. When Erdogan came to power, he indicated a willingness to work on a peace agreement with Kurdish forces. Fast forward to 2016 and violence between Kurdish militants and the state continues after a ceasefire with the PKK fell to the wayside in 2015. There have been demands for a renewal of the peace agreement, but they have been stifled, along with any other criticism of Turkey's government.

Turkey's domestic issues have been compounded by the

ongoing crisis in bordering Syria. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Turkey hosts an estimated 2.7 million Syrian refugees, making it the largest host country of registered refugees. Many refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey lack employment and education opportunities. The Turkish-Syrian border remains closed and the situation remains tense.

Looking forward, Turkey seems set to continue down the road to autocracy. The country was once positioned to join the European Union, but the political events of 2016 led to a suspension of accession negotiations. Unless steps are taken to reverse course, Turkey's instability will remain a critical issue in the region. Ongoing external pressures, especially Syria's uncertain future, coupled with Turkey's internal security and political issues indicate that Turkey has a difficult road ahead.



AND NOW FOR SOME GOOD NEWS: WHERE THE WORLD IS GETTING BETTER

DANIEL GANZ

The most fragile — and the most worsened — countries tend to attract the most attention in the Fragile States Index (FSI). However, the reality is that the majority of countries are improving based on the FSI's trends, and a number of countries have made considerable progress in the past decade based on their FSI scores. These examples demonstrate that a long-term commitment to peace and reconciliation, poverty reduction, and economic growth collectively contributes to a government's legitimization, and ultimately, the stability of its country.

In the first Fragile States Index in 2005 (albeit with a more limited sample of only 76 countries), **Colombia** ranked 14th; now, in 2017, Colombia ranks 69th. Even in the past decade, the difference is remarkable — in 2008, Ingrid Betancourt, anti-corruption activist and politician, was rescued by the Colombian army after being held hostage by rebels of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) movement for six years. Increasing concern that hostage-taking would continue served as an important catalyst to the next series of peace talks held between the Government of Colombia and the FARC. Four years later, in 2012, a ceasefire was negotiated and in 2014, the government and FARC began a large-scale crop substitution program, promoting the growth of licit crops to sustain the countryside's livelihoods rather than its continued dependency on illicit drugs. In 2016, the government and FARC rebels came to peace deal, that after getting rejected by voters, was revised and ratified, ending the 52-year conflict. As a relatively developed country with a well-educated population and relative political stability, Colombia was certainly held back by the conflict. Now, as that conflict draws to a close, Colombia's score has rapidly improved, demonstrating very clearly the severe cost that accompanies conflict.

Whereas Colombia's progress was fueled largely by peacebuilding efforts, **Moldova's** move towards increased stability results from its attention to political and institutional reforms and the economy. In 2014, the country, and its

citizens, began to experience rapid improvement when it signed its association agreement with the EU. At the same time, a World Bank Group report found that Moldova's regulatory reforms made it easier for local entrepreneurs to do business. For example, Moldova was ranked 92nd out of 178 countries in the World Bank's *Doing Business* report in 2008; ten years later, that ranking has been cut in half, with Moldova coming in at #47. Moldova also made significant democratic reforms, such as the constitutional court's ruling in 2016 that the popular vote will now determine the results of presidential elections rather than parliamentary vote.

Nearly ten years ago, **Bosnia and Herzegovina's** Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU was put on hold, citing the country's political, institutional, and economic setbacks at the time. Since then, the country has fought hard to regain its EU standing yet it was not until seven years later, in March 2015, that the EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina returned to the Agreement. One year after that, Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted its application to join the EU. It was later accepted, provided that the country continue its reforms in the areas of rule of law and governance. In 2016, cultural and political gains gave the country reason to celebrate and heal wherein former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic was convicted for war crimes and genocide, ending a 20-year effort to hold him accountable for the atrocities in the 1992-1995 war.

Indonesia's last decade was marked by the government's retaliatory crackdown on Islamic extremists and a flexing of its economic muscles, gradually becoming the tenth largest economy in the world in terms of purchasing power. Indonesia's campaign against those responsible for terrorist attacks, including the suicide bombings at the JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels, culminated with the 2012 conviction of Umar Patek for his role in the 2002 Bali attacks, ending a decade's long investigation into the bombings. During this same period, Indonesia's inauguration as a G20 member in 2008 formally recognized the country's growing influence in




the global economy. As the world's fourth most populous nation, Indonesia's commitment to institutional reforms led to historic lows of its poverty rate to 10.9% and a 66% increase of GDP per capita from US\$2,168 (2008) to US\$3,603 (2016).

Serbia's place amongst FSI's most improved countries over the last decade began on a most inauspicious note, starting with the repercussions resulting from its role in the region's wars in the last 20 years. In 2008, this started with Kosovo's declaration of independence in February and ended with the arrests of Radovan Karadzic and police chief Stojan Zupljanin. Whether these events served as a catalyst or not, Serbia's increased willingness and acknowledgement of its role in the Bosnian and Kosovar conflicts began the country's long road back to political and economic stability. The Progressive Party was growing in influence and following 2013 Brussels Agreement, Serbia's efforts to join the EU were back on track. The government's institutional reforms (e.g. streamlining its business registration process) were also beginning to bear fruit, with Serbia' ranking in the 2016 World Bank's *Doing Business* report (54th) representing a dramatic improvement from a ranking of 116th a decade ago. Further economic progress was noticeable in 2016 with an increase in domestic investment and a decrease in its unemployment rate from 17.7% in 2015 to 13% in 2016.

Since his rise to power ten years ago, **Cuba's** leader Raul Castro has accomplished more to improve Cuba-U.S. relations, usher in modern technologies, and stimulate its economy than his brother had done in the previous half a century. For example, in 2008, restrictions on owning mobile phones were lifted. In 2009, U.S. President Obama lifted restrictions on Cuban Americans to visit and allow them to send money to Cuba. In August 2011, President Raul Castro's plan to enact economic reforms such as owning small businesses and reducing bureaucracy was approved by the National Assembly. With the 2013 re-election of President Raul Castro, Cuba was removed from the list of being a sponsor to terrorism, and banking ties between the two countries quickly followed. These incremental changes in Cuba's political, economic, and social landscapes contribut-

MOST IMPROVED COUNTRY TRENDS



ed to the historic events of 2016 that included the US easing trade restrictions to Cuba, diplomatic ties between the EU and Cuba were established, and President Obama became the first sitting U.S. president to visit the country in 88 years.

In the face of terrorist attacks and war, extreme poverty, and economic stagnation, these six countries established foundations for recovery that they are now benefitting from in 2016, as noted above. It is certainly a credit to each country's long-term commitment and resolve to improve the quality of life for its citizens.

While these same six countries still face significant obstacles – ethnic tensions are on the rise, government reforms have fallen short of expectations, and corruption levels threaten the legitimacy of state institutions – they all have their own roadmaps, ones that led to successes in the recent past.

COLOMBIA ENJOYS A PEACE DIVIDEND AFTER HALF-CENTURY OF CONFLICT

CHRISTINA MURPHY

Colombia captured international headlines and accolades in 2016 when the government signed a peace deal with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). This victory for President Juan Manuel Santos' government marked the beginning of the end for one of the world's longest running civil wars. Although the deal was narrowly rejected by Colombian voters in October 2016, the Colombian Congress approved a revised deal in November.

The conflict between the Colombian government, the FARC, and other guerilla and paramilitary groups has taken a devastating toll on Colombia over the past half-century. More than 220,000 people were killed between 1958 and 2012, mainly civilians, and more than 7 million people have been displaced by the conflict. Estimates suggest that the conflict also cost the country billions in lost economic growth.

While the agreement was a major win for the country in 2016, it comes on the heels of a much longer trajectory of improving governance and legitimacy in Colombia. In fact, Colombia has been steadily improving every year since the FSI began, from a total score of 91.8 and ranking of 27 in 2006, to being ranked 69th in 2017 with a score of 78.9.

One of the key factors in Colombia's improvement has been State Legitimacy, moving from a score of 8.7 in 2006 to 6.3 in 2017. The Security Apparatus score also improved from 9.0 to 6.9 during the same period. The Colombian government has historically had a weak and uneven presence in parts of the country, particularly in rural areas, which has contributed to societal fragmentation and mistrust of government, creating a vacuum for powerful non-state entities. The state's legitimacy has been further undermined by widespread corruption and the lucrative cocaine trade. During the term of President Álvaro Uribe, however, the government began a concerted military effort to combat the drug trade and reassert its authority. During this period, the Colombian military nearly doubled in size, with support from the U.S.-

funded Plan Colombia package, and made advances in the fight against the FARC, the National Liberation Army (ELN), and other guerilla groups. Between 2003 and 2006, key paramilitary groups including the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) were also officially demobilized, although reports of human rights abuses by successor groups have continued. Levels of violence, displacement, and the number of kidnappings have subsequently dropped from their peaks in 2002. As security has improved in the country, Colombia has also seen improvements in the Human Flight and Brain Drain, Refugees and IDPs, and External Intervention indicator scores.

However, the extension of state and military authority has not come without high social and economic costs to the Colombian people. The effort to combat the FARC and other armed groups resulted in the deaths of thousands of soldiers, guerilla and paramilitary fighters, and civilians. Human rights groups reported widespread abuses by military forces and government-supported paramilitary groups, including thousands of so-called "false-positive" killings, in which civilians were killed and passed off as members of guerilla groups to inflate the body count and demonstrate military effectiveness. The government also cracked down on journalists, human rights groups, and political opponents during this time. And finally, the focus of government expenditures on security diverted money away from much-needed infrastructure and social services development. As a result of these factors, Colombia has seen only marginal changes in its Human Rights and Rule of Law score, from 7.6 in 2006 to 7.0 in 2017.

The FSI scores over the past decade also point to a number of areas in which the Colombian state faces ongoing pressures: namely in the areas of Human Rights, Public Services, Demographic Pressures, Group Grievance, and Uneven Economic Development, which have seen the least

CONTINUED ON PAGE 23



CRACKS IN THE FOUNDATION: UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM


NATE HAKEN

Society is more resilient to shocks when social, economic, political and security pressures are manageable. However, an improving economy does not guarantee social and political cohesion.

The United States is a case in point. In 2016, unemployment (at 4.9%) was at a 9-year low; GDP per capita (at US\$57,500) was at an all-time high; public services, including healthcare, had been improving for the most at-risk populations since 2013. And yet in 2016, two key indicators — Factionalized Elites and Group Grievance — spiked to unprecedented levels during and after a vitriolic presidential election campaign in which intense discriminatory rhetoric was used to demonize Muslims and immigrants, and a series of high-profile police shootings sparked protests across the country, exacerbating tensions racial in African-American communities.

This is not to say that people are not in economic distress. Certainly, these macro-economic improvements mask long term trends of high inequality which leave large numbers with less margin for error and find themselves slipping through the cracks. Inequality is difficult to measure because depending on how the population is divided up, there are very different results in terms of how much the “winners” are winning and how much the “losers” are losing. For the Uneven Development indicator, the FSI draws heavily on World Bank data such as the GINI Index, which measures variations in income inequality. Income share held by highest and lowest 10%, and difference between rural and urban populations in areas like water and sanitation, which does not show a worsening in inequality over the last 10 years — virtually everybody has running water and toilet facilities. However, as indicated above, there are losers in this economy, including many in mining, manufacturing and retail. And even running water, though virtually universal, is not always as dependable as once taken for granted, as evidenced in Flint, Michigan and many other communities across the country.

UNITED STATES: FSI TRENDLINES



According to a widely-cited article by Anne Case and Angus Deaton,¹ the death rate of white Americans between the ages of 45 and 54 increased by over 20% between 1999 and 2013 due in part to drug and alcohol poisoning and suicide.

The economy may be improving, but society is not altogether well. In 2016, people variously diagnosed causes and perpetrators of deep-seated problems and chased after radical solutions. But it was not inevitable that Group Grievance and Factionalized Elites would suddenly spike as much as they did at this point in time. There was no major crisis (disaster, pandemic, recession, or attack) that triggered it. For forecasters, this should give pause ... unless the unit of analysis is not necessarily the state and something bigger is blowing in the wind.

The year 2016 was also a year of resurgent nationalism in other Western countries, such as in Austria, France, and the



Netherlands. It was also the year of Brexit. When the British voted 51.9% to 48.1% to leave the European Union, it was perhaps the most significant geo-political development of the year. The “Leave” campaign made the argument that over-regulation was holding back the economy and that immigrants were taking British jobs. It is true that after the global financial crisis, economic vitality in the U.K. has not been the same: GDP Per Capita peaked in 2007 at \$49,949 and by 2009 had plummeted to \$38,010 and been limping along ever since. Granting that the British economy has been less than robust for the last 15 years, why would cracks form in the European Union now? The U.K. has been a member of the European Union since 1973, so these are surely not new issues.

In retrospect one might connect the dots in any number of different ways. For instance, rising social and political tensions across the West could be attributed to rising fears of economic dislocation in the context of globalization, exacerbated by social and cultural fears triggered by the effects of Arab Spring (conflict, terrorism, and mass displacement). Perhaps these fears were amplified and distorted by a furious storm of social media in a new communication landscape. If this is the case, it would suggest that volatility is not going away anytime soon. For policy makers seeking to promote resilience in such a complex environment, tariffs, walls, and bans will only go so far.



1. <http://www.pnas.org/content/112/49/15078.full>

COLOMBIA ENJOYS A PEACE DIVIDEND AFTER 52 YEARS OF CONFLICT

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 21

improvement. Although Colombia’s highest score is in Economy (4.2), the score for Economy has actually worsened by a full point since the 2006 FSI.

The peace agreement with the FARC marks an important, and hopefully permanent, turning point in Colombian history and should be celebrated. Yet plenty of work remains. Negotiations with other guerilla groups in the country are ongoing, and Colombia will continue to face numerous challenges to consolidate recent gains, fully implement the terms of the peace agreement, and begin the much longer processes of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegra-



tion (DDR), peacebuilding, and reconciliation. As the defeat of the referendum in October demonstrates, issues such as amnesty remain contentious and the Colombian public is divided. In the coming years, the crucial test will be the state’s ability to effectively navigate the social and political changes of the post-conflict period while also addressing underlying conflict drivers and incentive structures to prevent a return to conflict.

By building on the gains of the previous decade in state legitimacy and security, and placing additional emphasis on promoting human rights, equitable development, and social reconciliation, Colombia may yet successfully navigate the transition to a peaceful post-conflict era.

THE METHODOLOGY BEHIND THE FRAGILE STATES INDEX

In a highly interconnected world, pressures on one fragile state can have serious repercussions not only for that state and its people, but also for its neighbors and other states halfway across the globe. Since the end of the Cold War, a number of states have erupted into mass violence stemming from internal conflict. Some of these crises emerge from ethnic tensions; some are civil wars; others take on the form of revolutions; and many result in complex humanitarian emergencies.

Fault lines can emerge between identity groups, defined by language, religion, race, ethnicity, nationality, class, caste, clan or area of origin. Tensions can deteriorate into conflict through a variety of circumstances, such as competition over resources, predatory or fractured leadership, corruption, or unresolved group grievances. The reasons for state fragility are complex but not unpredictable. It is critically important that the international community understand and closely monitor the conditions that contribute to fragility — and be prepared to take the necessary actions to deal with the underlying issues or otherwise mitigate the negative effects.

To have meaningful early warning, and effective policy responses, assessments must go beyond specialized area knowledge, narrative case studies and anecdotal evidence to identify and grasp broad social trends. A mixed approach integrating qualitative and quantitative data sources is needed to establish patterns and trends. With the right data and analysis it is possible to identify problems that may be simmering below the surface. Decision makers need access to this kind of information to implement effective policies.

The Fragile States Index (FSI) produced by The Fund for Peace (FFP), is a critical tool in highlighting not only the normal pressures that all states experience, but also in identifying when those pressures are outweighing a states' capacity to manage those pressures. By highlighting pertinent vulnerabilities which contribute to the risk of state fragility, the Index — and the social science framework and

the data analysis tools upon which it is built — makes political risk assessment and early warning of conflict accessible to policy-makers and the public at large.

The strength of the FSI is its ability to distill millions of pieces of information into a form that is relevant as well as easily digestible and informative. Daily, FFP collects thousands of reports and information from around the world, detailing the existing social, economic and political pressures faced by each of the 178 countries that we analyze.

ORIGINS OF THE FRAGILE STATES INDEX: THE CAST FRAMEWORK

The genesis of most indices is to begin with a concept of what needs to be measured, followed by the development of a methodology that hopes to perform that measurement. The FSI followed a very different trajectory, whereby the idea for the Index occurred subsequently to the development of its own methodology.

FSI traces its origins to the creation of FFP's Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), that was developed in the 1990s as a framework for policymakers and field practitioners to be able to better understand and measure conflict drivers and dynamics in complex environments. The CAST framework has been widely peer reviewed, and the continued usage of the framework by many of those same professionals, as well as now by local civil society and community groups in conflict-affected areas, is testament to the framework's enduring relevance. In 2004, the CAST framework was used as the basis for the FSI, as researchers wished to determine whether state fragility could be assessed and ranked at a national level using the existing framework.

PRACTICAL APPLICATION:

THE FRAGILE STATES INDEX ANALYTICAL PROCESS

Though at the ground level, the CAST framework is applied using various practices such as individual incident reporting and observation by field monitors, the sheer volume of data to be analyzed at an international level required a different approach. To that end, technology was employed to enable researchers to process large volumes of data to perform the national level assessments that feed in to the FSI.

Based on CAST's comprehensive social science approach, data from three main streams — pre-existing quantitative data sets, content analysis, and qualitative expert analysis — is triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the Index.

1. **Content Analysis:** Each of the twelve indicators of the CAST framework are broken down into sub-indicators, and for each of these, hundreds of Boolean search phrases are applied to global media data to determine the level of saliency of issues for each of those sub-indicators in each country. The raw data, provided by a commercial content aggregator, includes media articles, research reports, and other qualitative data points collected from over 10,000 different English-language sources around the world. Every year, the number of articles and reports analyzed is between 45-50 million. Based on the assessed saliency for each of the sub-indicators, provisional scores are apportioned for each country.
2. **Quantitative Data:** Pre-existing quantitative data sets, generally from international and multilateral statistical agencies (such as the United Nations, World Bank, World Health Organization) are identified for their ability to statistically represent key aspects of the indicators. The raw data sets are normalized and scaled for comparative analysis. The trends identified in the quantitative analysis for each country are then compared with the provisional scores from the Content Analysis phase. Depending on the degree to which the Content Analysis and the Quantitative Data agree, the provisional scores are confirmed, or where they disagree, are reconciled based

on a set of rules that dictate allowable movements in score in the event of disagreement between the two data streams.


3. **Qualitative Review:** Separately, a team of social science researchers independently reviews each of the 178 countries, providing assessments based on key events from that year, compared to the previous one. Recognizing that every data set and approach has different strengths and weaknesses, this step helps to ensure that dynamic year-on-year trends across different indicators are picked up – which may not be evident in lagging quantitative data sets that measure longer term structural

factors. It also helps to mitigate any potential false positives or negative that may emerge from noisy content analysis data.

These three data streams are then triangulated, applying a set of rules to ensure the data sets are integrated in a way that leverages the strengths of the different approaches. This approach also helps to ensure that inherent weaknesses, gaps, or biases in one source is checked by the others. Though the basic data underpinning of the Index is already freely and widely available electronically, the strength of the analysis is in the methodological rigor and the

systematic integration of a wide range of data sources. Final indicator scores for each country are then produced based on from this process. A panel review is then conducted by the research team of the final index to ensure all scores are proportionate across the country spectrum.

The final FSI Index product is intended as an entry point into deeper interpretive analysis for the user – in line with the CAST framework approach. Though an index inherently ranks different countries – making some more fragile than others – ultimately the goal of the FSI is to measure trends in pressures within each individual state. By identifying the most salient pressures within a country, it creates the opportunity for deeper analysis and planning by policy makers and practitioners alike to strengthen each state's resiliency. To that end, the following section outlines what each indicator seeks to measure in the Index – as well as providing guiding questions for deeper levels of analysis and inquiry by the user.



COHESION INDICATORS

SECURITY APPARATUS



The Security Apparatus indicator considers the security threats to a state, such as bombings, attacks and battle-related deaths, rebel movements, mutinies, coups, or terrorism. The Security Apparatus also takes into account serious criminal factors, such as organized crime and homicides, and perceived trust of citizens in domestic security. In some instances, the security apparatus may extend beyond traditional military or police forces to include state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected “enemies,” or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition. In other instances, the security apparatus of a state can include a “deep state”, that may consist of secret intelligence units, or other irregular security forces, that serve the interests of a political leader or clique. As a counter example, the indicator will also take into account armed resistance to a governing authority, particularly the manifestation of violent uprisings and insurgencies, proliferation of independent militias, vigilantes, or mercenary groups that challenge the state’s monopoly of the use of force.

Questions to consider may include:*

Monopoly on the Use of Force

- Is the military under civilian control?
- Do private militias exist against the state?
- Is there paramilitary activity?
- Do private armies exist to protect assets?
- Are there guerilla forces operating in the state? Do they control territory?

Relationship Between Security and Citizenry

- Are the police considered to be professional?
- Is violence often state-sponsored and politically motivated?
- Is the government dealing well with any insurgency or security situation?

Force

- Does the military and police maintain proper use of force?
- Are there accusations of police brutality?

Arms

- Is there a high availability of weapons?
- If in reconstruction, is there an adequate plan for demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants?

C1

FACTIONALIZED ELITES



The Factionalized Elites indicator considers the fragmentation of state institutions along ethnic, class, clan, racial or religious lines, as well as and brinksmanship and gridlock between ruling elites. It also factors the use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of nationalism, xenophobia, communal irredentism (e.g., a “greater Serbia”) or of communal solidarity (e.g., “ethnic cleansing” or “defending the faith”). In extreme cases, it can be representative of the absence of legitimate leadership widely accepted as representing the entire citizenry. The Factionalized Elites indicator measures power struggles, political competition, political transitions, and where elections occur will factor in the credibility of electoral processes (or in their absence, the perceived legitimacy of the ruling class).

C2

GROUP GRIEVANCE

C3

Questions to consider may include:*

Representative Leadership

- Is leadership fairly elected? Is leadership representative of the population?
- Are there factionalized elites, tribal elites and/or fringe groups? How powerful are they?
- Is there a political reconciliation process?
- Is the military representative of the population?

Identity

- Is there a sense of national identity? Are there strong feelings of nationalism? Or are there calls for separatism?
- Does hate speech via radio and media exist?
- Is religious, ethnic, or other stereotyping prevalent and is there scape-goating?
- Does cross-cultural respect exist?

Resource Distribution

- Is wealth concentrated in the hands of a few?
- Is there a burgeoning middle class?
- Does any one group control the majority of resources?
- Are resources fairly distributed? Does the government adequately distribute wealth through its tax system and taxes?

Equality and Equity

- Are the laws democratic or extreme?
- Is the system representative of the population?



The Group Grievance Indicator focuses on divisions and schisms between different groups in society – particularly

divisions based on social or political characteristics – and their role in access to services or resources, and inclusion in the political process. Group Grievance may also have a historical component, where aggrieved communal groups cite injustices of the past, sometimes going back centuries, that influence and shape that group's role in society and relationships with other groups. This history may in turn be shaped by patterns of real or perceived atrocities or "crimes" committed with apparent impunity against communal groups. Groups may also feel aggrieved because they are denied autonomy, self-determination or political independence to which they believe they are entitled. The Indicator also considers where specific groups are singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or repression, or where there is public scapegoating of groups believed to have acquired wealth, status or power "illegitimately", which may manifest itself in the emergence of fiery rhetoric, such as through "hate" radio, pamphleteering, and stereotypical or nationalistic political speech.

Questions to consider may include:*

Post-Conflict Response

- Does a Truth & Reconciliation process exist or is one needed?
- Have groups been reintegrated?
- Is there a plan for reconstruction and development?
- Are victims of past atrocities compensated or is there a plan to compensate them?
- Are war criminals apprehended and prosecuted? Do the public feel they are properly punished?
- Has amnesty been granted?

Equality

- Is there an equitable and efficient distribution of resources?

Divisions

- Are there feelings of or reports of ethnic and/or religious intolerance and/or violence?
- Are groups oppressed or do they feel oppressed?
- Is there history of violence against a group or group grievance?
- How are intertribal and/or interethnic relations?
- Is there freedom of religion according to laws and practiced by society? Are there reports of religiously motivated violence?

Communal Violence

- Is vigilante justice reported?
- Are the reports of mass violence and/or killings?

ECONOMIC INDICATORS

ECONOMIC DECLINE AND POVERTY



The Economic Decline Indicator, considers factors related to economic decline within a country. For example, the Indicator looks at patterns of progressive economic decline of the society as a whole as measured by per capita income, Gross National Product, unemployment rates, inflation, productivity, debt, poverty levels, or business failures. It also takes into account sudden drops in commodity prices, trade revenue, or foreign investment, and any collapse or devaluation of the national currency. The Economic Decline Indicator further considers the responses to economic conditions and their consequences, such as extreme social hardship imposed by economic austerity programs, or perceived increasing group inequalities. The Economic Decline Indicator is focused on the formal economy – as well as illicit trade, including the drug and human trafficking, and capital flight, or levels of corruption and illicit transactions such as money laundering or embezzlement.

Questions to consider may include:*

Public Finances

- What level is the government debt?

Economic Conditions

- How are the interest rates – actual and projected?
- How is the inflation rate – actual and projected?
- What is the level of productivity?
- What is the GDP – actual and projected?
- How is the unemployment – current and rate of unemployment?

Economic Climate

- Consumer Confidence: How do people view the economy?
- How do experts view the economy?
- Is the business climate attractive to Foreign Direct Investment?
- Do the laws and access to capital allow for internal entrepreneurship?

Economic Diversification

- Economic Focus: Does one product make up the majority of the economy?

E1

UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT



The Uneven Economic Development Indicator considers inequality within the economy, irrespective of the actual performance of an economy. For example, the Indicator looks at structural inequality that is based on group (such as racial, ethnic, religious, or other identity group) or based on education, economic status, or region (such as urban-rural divide). The Indicator considers not only actual inequality, but also perceptions of inequality, recognizing that perceptions of economic inequality can fuel grievance as much as real inequality, and can reinforce communal tensions or nationalistic rhetoric. Further to measuring economic inequality, the Indicator also takes into account the opportunities for groups to improve their economic status, such as through access to employment, education, or job training such that even if there is economic inequality present, to what degree it is structural and reinforcing.

**Indicator descriptions are not exhaustive, and are intended only as an entry point for further interpretive analysis by the user.*

E2

HUMAN FLIGHT AND BRAIN DRAIN

E3

Questions to consider may include:*

Economic Equality

- Economic Equality: Is there a large economic gap?
- Is the economic system discriminatory?
- Does economic justice exist?
- Are hiring practices generally fair – legally and perceived?
- Do equal rights exist in the society?
- Are there laws protecting equal rights?

Economic Opportunity

- Does free education exist and if so, to which grade?
- Is the education provided relatively equal?
- Fair Housing: Is there a housing system for the poor?
- Do programs for job training exist?
- Do people know about the job training and is it available based on qualification and need?

Socio-Economic Dynamics

- Do ghettos and slums exist?



The Human Flight and Brain Drain Indicator considers the economic impact of human displacement (for economic or political reasons) and the consequences this may have on a country's development. On the one hand, this may involve the voluntary emigration of the middle class – particularly economically productive segments of the population, such as entrepreneurs, or skilled workers such as physicians – due to economic deterioration in their home country and the hope of better opportunities farther afield. On the other hand, it may involve the forced displacement of professionals or intellectuals who are fleeing their country due to actual or feared persecution or repression, and specifically the economic impact that displacement may wreak on an economy through the loss of productive, skilled professional labor.

Questions to consider may include:*

Retention of Technical and Intellectual Capital

- Are professionals leaving the country?
- Are politicians or political elites leaving the country?
- Is there a relatively high proportion of higher educated people leaving the country?
- Is the middle class beginning to return to the country?

Economics

- Are there a large amount of remittances coming to families from relatives overseas?

Diaspora

- Is there growth of a country's exiled communities or Diasporas abroad?
- Does the Diaspora have an impact on the home state economy, or on politics in the home state?

POLITICAL INDICATORS

STATE LEGITIMACY



The State Legitimacy Indicator considers the representativeness and openness of government and its relationship with its citizenry. The Indicator looks at the population's level of confidence in state institutions and processes, and assesses the effects where that confidence is absent, manifested through mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, or the rise of armed insurgencies. Though the State Legitimacy indicator does not necessarily make a judgment on democratic governance, it does consider the integrity of elections where they take place (such as flawed or boycotted elections), the nature of political transitions, and where there is an absence of democratic elections, the degree to which the government is representative of the population of which it governs. The Indicator takes into account openness of government, specifically the openness of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation, or conversely the levels of corruption, profiteering, and marginalizing, persecuting, or otherwise excluding opposition groups. The Indicator also considers the ability of a state to exercise basic functions that infer a population's confidence in its government and institutions, such as through the ability to collect taxes.

Questions to consider may include:*

Confidence in the Political Process

- Does the government have the confidence of the people?

Political Opposition

- Have demonstrations occurred?
- Have riots or uprisings occurred?

Transparency

- Is there evidence of corruption on the part of government officials?
- Are national and/or local officials considered to be corrupt?

Openness and Fairness of the Political Process

- Do all parties enjoy political rights?
- Is the government representative of the population?
- Have there been recent peaceful transitions of power?
- What is the longer term history of power transitions?
- Are elections perceived to be free and fair?
- Have elections been monitored and reported as free and fair?

Political Violence

- Are there reports of politically motivated attacks, assassinations?
- Are there reports of armed insurgents and attacks?
- Have there been terrorist attacks and how likely are they?

P1

PUBLIC SERVICES



The Public Services Indicator refers to the presence of basic state functions that serve the people. On the one hand, this may include the provision of essential services, such as health, education, water and sanitation, transport infrastructure, electricity and power, and internet and connectivity. On the other hand, it may include the state's ability to protect its citizens, such as from terrorism and violence, through perceived effective policing. Further, even where basic state functions and services are provided, the Indicator further considers to whom – whether the state narrowly serves the ruling elites, such as security agencies, presidential staff, the central bank, or the diplomatic service, while failing to provide comparable levels of service to the general populace – such as rural versus urban populations. The Indicator also considers the level and maintenance of general infrastructure to the extent that its absence would negatively affect the country's actual or potential development.

**Indicator descriptions are not exhaustive, and are intended only as an entry point for further interpretive analysis by the user.*

P2

HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW

P3

Questions to consider may include:*

General Provision of Public Services

- Is there equal access to public services?
- What are the general conditions of public services?

Health

- Do people have adequate access to medicines?
- Are there an adequate number of medical facilities for all people?
- Are there an adequate number of medical professionals for the population?
- What is the infant mortality rate – actual and projected?
- Is there access to an adequate potable water supply?
- Is sanitation system adequate?

Education

- What is the level of school enrollment? Is it different by gender?
- What are the literacy rates? Is it different by gender?

Shelter

- Do the poor have access to adequate housing?
- Are housing costs in line with the general economy?

Infrastructure

- Are roads adequate and safe?
- Are there adequate airports for sustainable development?
- Are there adequate railroads for sustainable development?
- Is there an adequate supply of fuel?



The Human Rights and Rule of Law Indicator considers the relationship between the state and its population insofar as fundamental human rights are protected and freedoms are observed and respected. The Indicator looks at whether there is widespread abuse of legal, political and social rights, including those of individuals, groups and institutions (e.g. harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political

ends, repression of political opponents). The Indicator also considers outbreaks of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence perpetrated against civilians. It also looks at factors such as denial of due process consistent with international norms and practices for political prisoners or dissidents, and whether there is current or emerging authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated.

Questions to consider may include:*

Civil and Political Rights

- Do communal, labor, political, and/or minority rights exist and are they protected?
- Are there civil rights laws and are civil rights protected?
- Is the right to life protected for all?

Civil and Political Freedoms

- Is freedom of speech protected?
- Is there freedom of movement?
- Does religious freedom exist? Does religious extremism exist?

Violation of Rights

- Is there a history of systemic violation of rights by the government or entity therein?
- Are there reports of state- or group-sponsored torture?
- Are there labor laws or reports of forced labor or child labor?
- Are groups forced to relocate? Is there proper compensation?

Openness

- Does independent media exist? Do its reporters feel free to publish accusations against those in power?
- Is there equal access to information?

Justice

- If rights are not protected, is there a legal system in which that can be addressed?
- Do accused receive a fair and timely trial? Is this equal for all?
- Are there accusations or reports of arbitrary arrests? Are these state-sponsored?
- Are there accusations or reports of illegal detention? Are these state-sponsored?
- How are the prison conditions?

Equality

- Is there a process and system that encourages political power sharing?

SOCIAL INDICATORS

DEMOGRAPHIC PRESSURES



The Demographic Pressures Indicator considers pressures upon the state deriving from the population itself or the environment around it. For example, the Indicator measures population pressures related to food supply, access to safe water, and other life-sustaining resources, or health, such as prevalence of disease and epidemics. The Indicator considers demographic characteristics, such as pressures from high population growth rates or skewed population distributions, such as a “youth or age bulge,” or sharply divergent rates of population growth among competing communal groups, recognizing that such effects can have profound social, economic, and political effects. Beyond the population, the Indicator also takes into account pressures stemming from natural disasters (hurricanes, earthquakes, floods or drought), and pressures upon the population from environmental hazards.

S1

REFUGEES AND IDPS



The Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons Indicator measures the pressure upon states caused by the forced displacement of large communities as a result of social, political, environmental or other causes, measuring displacement within countries, as well as refugee flows into others. The indicator measures refugees by country of Asylum, recognizing that population inflows can put additional pressure on public services, and can sometimes create broader humanitarian and security challenges for the receiving state, if that state does not have the absorption capacity and adequate resources. The Indicator also measures the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) and Refugees by country of origin, which signifies internal state pressures as a result of violence, environmental or other factors such as health epidemics. These measures are considered within the context of the state’s population (per capita) and human development trajectory, and over time (year on year spikes), recognizing that some IDPs or refugees for example, may have been displaced for long periods of time.

Questions to consider may include:*

Population

- Is the population growth rate sustainable? Is the current and projected distribution reasonable?
- Is population density putting pressure on areas of the state?
- What is the infant mortality rate – actual and projected?
- Is there a high orphan population?

Public Health

- Is there a system for controlling spreading of diseases, pandemics?
- Is there a high likelihood or existence of diseases of epidemics?

Food and Nutrition

- Is the food supply adequate to deal with potential interruption?
- Is there are likelihood of droughts?
- Is there a short-term food shortage or longer-term starvation?
- Are there long-term food shortages affecting health?

Environment

- Do sound environmental policies exist and are the current practices sustainable?
- Is natural disaster likely, recurring?
- If a natural disaster occurs, is there an adequate response plan?
- Has deforestation taken place or are there laws to protect forests?

Resources

- Does resource competition exist?
- Does land competition it and are there laws to arbitrate disputes?
- Is there access to an adequate potable water supply?

CROSS-CUTTING INDICATOR

S2

EXTERNAL INTERVENTION

X1

Questions to consider may include:*

Refugees

- Are refugees likely to come from neighboring countries?
- Are there resources to provide for projected and actual refugees?
- Are there sufficient refugee camps or are refugees integrated into communities?
- Are there reports of violence against refugees?
- Are conditions safe in refugee camps?

Internally Displaced Persons

- How many IDPs are there in relation to population?
- Are IDPs likely to increase in the near future?
- Are there resources to provide for projected and actual IDPs?

Response to Displacement

- Is there access to additional resources from international community for refugees and/or IDPs?
- Are there plans for relocation and settlement of current IDPs and/or refugees?



The External Intervention Indicator considers the influence and impact of external actors in the functioning – particularly security and economic – of a state. On the one hand, External Intervention focuses on security aspects of engagement from external actors, both covert and overt, in the internal affairs of a state at risk by governments, armies, intelligence services, identity groups, or other entities that may affect the balance of power (or resolution of a conflict) within a state. On the other hand, External Intervention also focuses on economic engagement by outside actors, including multilateral organizations, through large-scale loans, development projects, or foreign aid, such as ongoing budget support, control of finances, or management of the state's economic policy, creating economic dependency. External Intervention also takes into account humanitarian intervention, such as the deployment of an international peacekeeping mission.

Questions to consider may include:*

Political Intervention

- Is there external support for factions opposed to the government?

Force Intervention


























































- Are foreign troops present?
- Are military attacks from other countries occurring?
- Is there external military assistance?
- Are there military training exercises with other nations or support of military training from other states?
- Is there a peacekeeping operation on the ground?
- Is there external support for police training?
- Are covert operations taking place?


























































Economic Intervention


























































- Is the country receiving economic intervention or aid?
- Is the country dependent on economic aid?
























































**Indicator descriptions are not exhaustive, and are intended only as an entry point for further interpretive analysis by the user.*

INDICATOR SCORES 2017


														Total
		C1 SA	C2 FE	C3 GG	E1 EC	E2 UD	E3 HF	P1 SL	P2 PS	P3 HR	S1 DP	S2 RD	X1 EX	
9th	 Afghanistan	10.0	8.6	8.4	8.3	7.5	8.2	9.1	9.9	8.5	9.3	9.8	9.7	107.3
124th	 Albania	4.7	6.2	4.5	5.4	3.6	7.6	5.7	4.0	4.8	3.7	3.6	6.7	60.5
77th	 Algeria	7.2	7.1	7.1	6.6	6.6	5.8	6.9	6.0	6.6	5.2	6.8	4.9	76.8
32nd	 Angola	6.5	7.2	7.5	6.4	9.9	6.6	8.6	9.1	7.3	9.5	7.1	5.4	91.1
131st	 Antigua and Barbuda	5.7	3.7	3.9	4.5	4.5	6.8	5.4	3.8	4.4	4.1	2.7	5.3	54.8
140th	 Argentina	4.3	2.8	5.0	4.3	5.4	3.0	4.8	3.8	4.1	3.8	2.3	4.6	48.2
102nd	 Armenia	5.5	7.4	6.1	6.3	4.5	6.2	7.6	3.6	7.0	3.1	7.0	6.7	71.0
172nd	 Australia	2.1	1.7	3.9	1.7	2.2	1.3	1.0	1.5	2.3	1.3	2.3	1.0	22.3
166th	 Austria	1.0	3.2	4.5	2.2	2.9	1.5	1.4	1.1	1.2	1.9	5.6	1.2	27.7
81st	 Azerbaijan	6.2	7.9	6.5	4.1	5.9	4.3	8.8	5.4	8.5	4.6	7.7	6.4	76.3
134th	 Bahamas	4.6	4.5	4.1	4.8	4.5	4.7	3.8	4.6	3.6	6.9	2.6	3.7	52.4
118th	 Bahrain	6.9	7.6	8.4	3.8	4.6	3.5	8.2	1.8	8.8	4.1	2.4	4.8	64.9
39th	 Bangladesh	7.6	9.3	8.7	5.8	6.7	7.8	7.8	8.1	7.4	7.5	6.6	5.8	89.1
139th	 Barbados	4.4	4.2	4.1	5.9	4.6	5.4	2.5	2.7	2.9	4.4	2.5	6.0	49.6
95th	 Belarus	6.1	8.3	7.1	6.0	4.7	3.4	8.7	4.2	7.9	5.1	3.6	7.3	72.4
163rd	 Belgium	2.4	4.4	4.9	4.2	2.7	1.6	1.4	2.3	1.5	2.0	2.4	1.0	30.8
115th	 Belize	6.4	4.3	4.1	6.7	5.4	6.6	5.2	5.9	4.7	5.1	3.6	7.5	65.5
73rd	 Benin	6.2	6.7	3.4	6.6	7.6	7.4	5.4	8.7	5.2	8.3	5.5	6.6	77.6
83rd	 Bhutan	4.5	7.5	7.9	4.7	6.1	7.2	4.3	6.1	6.6	6.1	7.0	8.0	76.0
77th	 Bolivia	6.5	8.0	6.0	5.4	8.6	7.0	6.5	6.8	6.0	6.3	3.9	5.8	76.8
93rd	 Bosnia and Herzegovina	5.7	8.7	7.0	5.7	5.1	5.5	6.5	3.6	5.6	3.8	7.6	8.2	73.0
120th	 Botswana	4.1	3.3	4.9	5.8	7.8	5.5	3.3	7.3	5.0	8.2	4.5	4.1	63.8
110th	 Brazil	6.7	4.9	6.2	4.8	7.8	4.6	6.2	6.4	6.4	8.1	2.8	3.3	68.2
122nd	 Brunei	5.1	7.4	5.9	3.5	7.8	4.6	8.3	1.8	7.7	3.7	2.2	3.6	61.6
132nd	 Bulgaria	4.3	5.3	5.1	5.7	4.4	4.2	4.5	4.4	3.3	3.7	4.5	4.3	53.7
44th	 Burkina Faso	8.4	7.8	4.5	6.3	8.2	7.5	7.1	8.7	6.1	9.3	6.6	7.5	88.0
17th	 Burundi	8.8	8.2	7.9	8.0	7.2	6.3	8.8	8.0	8.8	9.3	8.6	9.0	98.9
50th	 Cambodia	6.7	8.3	6.9	5.7	6.6	7.6	8.3	7.8	7.7	7.0	5.7	7.4	85.7
26th	 Cameroon	7.9	9.1	8.3	6.6	7.6	7.6	8.4	8.7	7.5	8.1	8.0	7.8	95.6
169th	 Canada	2.2	2.5	3.4	1.8	2.5	1.7	1.0	1.5	1.3	1.9	1.8	1.0	22.6
106th	 Cape Verde	5.4	5.5	4.1	5.2	7.1	8.0	5.3	6.0	4.0	7.2	4.2	8.1	70.1
3rd	 Central African Republic	9.0	9.7	9.1	9.1	10.0	7.5	9.7	10.0	9.7	9.0	10.0	9.8	112.6
8th	 Chad	9.4	9.8	8.0	8.5	9.1	8.8	9.1	9.7	9.1	10.0	9.6	8.3	109.4
150th	 Chile	3.2	2.2	3.6	3.2	5.7	3.8	3.3	4.0	3.0	4.9	2.1	2.1	41.1
85th	 China	5.9	7.2	7.9	4.4	7.3	4.9	8.6	5.7	8.5	6.7	4.9	2.7	74.7
69th	 Colombia	6.9	7.6	7.3	4.2	7.6	6.2	6.3	5.9	7.0	6.2	7.7	6.0	78.9
52nd	 Comoros	6.7	8.0	5.4	8.0	7.5	7.4	7.3	8.2	6.3	7.3	4.7	8.0	84.8
7th	 Congo Democratic Republic	9.0	9.8	10.0	8.4	8.4	6.6	9.6	9.5	9.8	9.4	10.0	9.5	110.0
29th	 Congo Republic	7.2	6.7	7.2	7.0	8.1	7.4	8.9	9.5	8.5	8.1	7.7	7.1	93.4
145th	 Costa Rica	3.6	3.8	4.2	4.0	5.3	4.1	2.4	3.9	1.5	3.3	3.9	4.1	44.1
21st	 Cote d'Ivoire	7.7	9.1	8.1	6.6	8.0	7.3	7.9	8.7	7.9	8.2	7.8	9.2	96.5
138th	 Croatia	3.5	4.4	5.8	5.3	3.3	4.7	2.9	2.4	3.6	3.1	7.0	4.6	50.6
119th	 Cuba	5.2	7.0	4.0	4.0	5.4	5.2	7.6	4.1	7.5	5.5	4.0	5.1	64.6
121st	 Cyprus	4.4	7.9	6.3	6.0	5.9	4.0	4.8	2.5	3.0	3.5	5.3	9.0	62.6
152nd	 Czech Republic	2.6	5.0	4.8	4.6	2.7	2.8	4.7	2.6	2.4	1.4	3.8	2.7	40.1

															Total
			C1 SA	C2 FE	C3 GG	E1 EC	E2 UD	E3 HF	P1 SL	P2 PS	P3 HR	S1 DP	S2 RD	X1 EX	
175th		Denmark	1.7	1.4	4.4	2.0	1.6	1.9	0.9	1.0	1.5	2.0	2.1	1.0	21.5
41st		Djibouti	6.5	7.3	6.5	7.0	7.9	5.4	8.2	7.9	7.8	8.4	7.3	8.7	88.9
109th		Dominican Republic	5.8	6.2	5.8	5.5	5.8	7.1	5.5	6.3	5.8	6.5	3.3	5.4	69.0
75th		Ecuador	6.8	8.2	7.3	6.0	6.7	5.8	6.5	6.5	5.0	6.5	5.7	6.3	77.3
36th		Egypt	8.1	8.8	8.8	8.2	6.0	4.7	8.2	4.9	9.8	7.1	7.3	7.9	89.8
92nd		El Salvador	7.3	4.3	6.7	5.4	6.4	7.9	4.8	6.4	6.3	6.9	4.8	5.9	73.1
51st		Equatorial Guinea	6.5	8.2	6.3	6.5	8.7	5.5	9.8	7.9	9.2	7.5	3.9	5.0	85.0
19th		Eritrea	7.2	8.1	7.1	8.1	7.8	8.3	9.3	8.4	9.0	8.8	8.3	7.7	98.1
143rd		Estonia	3.3	5.9	7.3	3.5	3.2	4.0	2.7	2.9	1.7	2.8	3.1	4.3	44.7
15th		Ethiopia	8.4	8.7	9.1	7.0	6.5	7.6	8.2	8.8	9.0	9.8	9.3	8.7	101.1
76th		Fiji	7.1	7.9	6.9	6.5	6.3	8.2	6.9	5.0	6.9	4.9	3.1	7.2	76.9
178th		Finland	1.7	1.1	1.8	3.5	1.0	2.3	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.1	2.3	1.0	18.7
159th		France	3.3	1.9	7.0	4.3	3.2	2.2	1.3	1.1	2.1	2.8	2.5	1.8	33.5
91st		Gabon	5.2	7.4	3.8	5.5	6.5	6.1	8.2	6.7	7.5	6.7	4.5	5.7	73.8
37th		Gambia	6.3	7.8	3.8	8.4	6.9	8.3	8.6	7.8	9.4	8.3	6.8	7.0	89.4
79th		Georgia	6.8	9.1	7.9	5.5	5.5	4.9	8.3	4.3	5.6	3.7	7.5	7.4	76.5
165th		Germany	2.1	2.3	5.0	2.2	2.8	2.1	1.0	1.1	1.1	2.0	5.4	1.0	28.1
108th		Ghana	3.8	5.2	4.4	6.1	6.6	8.2	4.2	7.8	5.1	6.6	5.0	6.7	69.7
127th		Greece	4.5	4.1	5.4	6.5	3.7	3.3	6.7	3.8	3.2	3.7	6.5	6.1	57.5
123rd		Grenada	5.7	5.6	3.8	6.0	4.8	8.4	5.4	3.8	3.2	4.7	3.0	7.1	61.5
57th		Guatemala	7.6	7.1	8.5	5.5	8.1	7.3	6.5	7.5	7.2	7.0	5.6	5.2	83.1
12th		Guinea	8.8	9.6	8.6	9.2	7.7	7.4	9.6	9.5	7.7	8.7	8.2	7.4	102.4
16th		Guinea Bissau	8.9	9.6	5.2	8.3	9.1	8.1	9.2	9.4	7.5	8.6	7.3	8.3	99.5
100th		Guyana	6.4	5.1	6.7	6.0	5.7	9.4	5.4	6.2	3.5	5.8	3.8	7.3	71.3
11th		Haiti	7.7	9.6	6.5	8.7	9.8	8.8	9.7	9.7	7.6	9.5	7.7	10.0	105.3
68th		Honduras	7.3	6.8	5.9	6.4	7.7	6.4	6.8	6.8	6.9	6.3	4.3	7.5	79.1
135th		Hungary	2.7	5.3	4.8	5.4	3.8	3.3	6.1	3.2	5.2	1.8	6.5	3.9	52.0
171st		Iceland	1.0	1.8	1.3	3.3	1.1	2.8	1.3	1.2	1.0	1.6	2.0	4.1	22.5
72nd		India	7.4	7.3	8.3	5.1	7.0	6.1	4.7	7.4	6.0	7.9	5.3	5.4	77.9
94th		Indonesia	6.2	7.0	7.1	4.5	5.8	6.9	5.1	5.9	7.2	6.6	5.4	5.2	72.9
49th		Iran	7.5	9.6	9.3	6.4	5.6	6.5	9.0	4.5	9.5	4.9	6.5	6.5	85.8
10th		Iraq	10.0	9.6	9.6	6.6	7.3	7.7	9.5	8.2	8.7	8.6	9.9	9.7	105.4
172nd		Ireland	2.1	1.5	1.4	3.4	2.2	2.8	1.0	1.4	1.4	1.7	2.0	1.4	22.3
69th		Israel and West Bank	6.9	8.1	10.0	3.8	6.8	3.8	6.4	4.8	7.5	6.0	7.3	7.5	78.9
142nd		Italy	4.5	4.9	4.8	5.4	2.9	2.0	3.7	2.7	2.0	4.3	5.5	2.5	45.2
117th		Jamaica	6.9	3.7	3.4	6.9	5.1	8.4	4.8	6.4	5.5	5.2	3.1	5.8	65.2
156th		Japan	1.6	2.6	3.7	4.1	1.6	3.2	1.2	2.2	3.0	6.0	4.4	3.8	37.4
71st		Jordan	5.7	6.9	8.0	6.4	5.4	4.2	6.3	4.2	7.9	6.5	9.6	7.6	78.7
113th		Kazakhstan	5.2	7.6	7.6	6.4	4.2	3.6	8.3	4.0	7.3	4.5	3.0	4.2	65.9
22nd		Kenya	8.3	8.9	8.9	6.9	7.9	7.6	7.6	8.0	7.0	8.9	8.3	8.1	96.4
126th		Kuwait	4.2	7.8	4.7	3.0	4.2	3.6	7.2	2.6	7.9	5.0	3.5	4.8	58.5
65th		Kyrgyz Republic	6.5	8.0	8.4	7.0	5.9	7.0	7.7	5.1	7.5	5.5	5.3	6.4	80.3
59th		Laos	5.5	8.3	6.6	5.2	6.6	7.7	9.1	7.0	7.9	7.3	5.1	6.1	82.4
141st		Latvia	3.0	4.3	8.0	3.5	4.1	4.8	3.4	2.9	2.8	2.9	2.8	3.9	46.4
43rd		Lebanon	8.7	9.3	8.5	6.4	5.6	5.0	7.6	5.7	7.4	5.6	9.3	9.1	88.2

															
			C1	C2	C3	E1	E2	E3	P1	P2	P3	S1	S2	X1	Total
			SA	FE	GG	EC	UD	HF	SL	PS	HR	DP	RD	EX	
62nd		Lesotho	6.2	7.3	3.9	8.1	8.1	8.0	5.9	8.1	5.0	8.5	4.8	7.8	81.7
27th		Liberia	6.4	8.3	5.8	8.1	8.4	7.2	6.8	9.3	6.5	9.0	8.7	9.3	93.8
23rd		Libya	9.6	9.4	8.1	8.5	5.6	6.3	9.5	7.0	9.1	4.9	8.3	10.0	96.3
148th		Lithuania	3.1	3.0	4.4	4.5	4.5	4.4	2.7	3.5	2.5	2.8	2.3	4.0	41.7
168th		Luxembourg	1.7	3.4	3.1	1.2	1.6	2.1	1.0	2.1	1.0	1.6	3.5	1.1	23.4
112th		Macedonia	5.6	7.3	6.9	5.8	5.2	5.2	5.8	3.9	3.8	3.3	7.3	6.0	66.1
55th		Madagascar	7.1	7.8	4.1	7.6	9.1	6.7	7.1	9.1	5.6	9.1	3.9	6.8	84.0
44th		Malawi	4.8	8.1	5.6	8.4	8.3	7.9	6.4	8.6	6.2	9.7	5.8	8.2	88.0
116th		Malaysia	6.3	6.8	6.5	3.1	5.0	5.0	7.7	4.2	8.0	5.3	3.7	3.8	65.4
86th		Maldives	6.4	8.0	4.8	5.9	3.6	6.2	8.5	5.6	8.2	6.0	4.7	6.5	74.4
31st		Mali	9.0	4.9	7.4	7.7	7.4	8.5	6.1	8.8	7.3	8.5	7.9	9.4	92.9
153rd		Malta	3.6	2.0	3.9	4.0	2.6	3.7	3.6	2.0	3.0	2.5	4.4	3.3	38.6
28th		Mauritania	6.9	8.8	7.0	7.7	6.8	6.9	8.0	9.0	7.9	8.7	8.0	8.0	93.7
148th		Mauritius	2.3	3.2	3.6	4.0	3.5	4.4	3.0	3.3	3.4	3.6	2.7	4.7	41.7
88th		Mexico	8.4	5.4	7.2	4.9	6.1	5.8	6.5	6.8	6.5	6.1	5.1	5.5	74.3
80th		Micronesia	4.6	5.6	4.0	8.8	8.3	9.8	5.5	6.0	3.3	7.1	3.9	9.5	76.4
98th		Moldova	6.1	8.3	7.3	6.4	4.8	6.6	6.6	4.9	4.9	4.8	3.9	7.4	72.0
128th		Mongolia	3.6	5.5	3.8	5.0	6.4	3.3	4.0	5.4	4.5	5.1	3.0	7.1	56.7
130th		Montenegro	4.0	6.5	7.9	5.2	2.4	4.0	4.6	3.1	4.1	2.8	4.6	6.5	55.7
84th		Morocco	5.8	6.6	7.7	4.8	6.2	8.2	6.7	5.2	6.8	4.8	6.1	6.0	74.9
40th		Mozambique	6.7	6.6	5.4	8.0	8.8	8.0	6.5	9.7	5.6	9.9	5.8	8.0	89.0
35th		Myanmar	8.9	8.3	9.7	5.9	7.7	6.4	8.6	8.5	8.9	6.8	8.7	7.3	95.7
103rd		Namibia	5.5	3.5	5.8	6.8	8.2	7.1	3.3	7.4	3.8	7.6	5.0	6.4	70.4
33rd		Nepal	6.5	8.8	9.4	7.5	6.7	6.5	7.4	7.2	7.7	8.6	7.8	6.9	91.0
167th		Netherlands	1.5	3.1	4.5	2.7	2.2	2.6	1.3	1.0	1.0	2.5	3.8	1.2	27.4
170th		New Zealand	1.2	1.4	3.6	3.6	2.3	2.1	0.9	1.4	1.0	2.1	1.8	1.2	22.6
74th		Nicaragua	5.6	7.1	6.5	5.7	8.0	8.1	7.9	6.7	5.2	5.3	4.0	7.3	77.4
20th		Niger	8.7	8.9	8.0	7.5	8.5	7.5	7.3	9.5	6.5	9.0	7.9	8.1	97.4
13th		Nigeria	9.2	9.6	9.2	8.0	8.6	7.2	8.6	9.2	8.9	9.1	7.5	6.5	101.6
30th		North Korea	8.3	8.5	5.8	8.9	7.5	4.4	10.0	8.6	9.4	7.7	4.4	9.8	93.3
177th		Norway	2.0	1.1	3.6	2.2	1.5	1.6	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.5	2.8	1.3	20.5
133rd		Oman	4.2	6.6	2.9	4.1	4.6	2.5	6.8	3.5	7.7	4.8	2.5	2.3	52.5
17th		Pakistan	9.1	8.9	10.0	6.9	6.5	7.2	8.1	7.7	8.0	8.4	8.7	9.4	98.9
137th		Panama	5.4	2.2	5.6	2.6	7.4	4.6	3.2	4.8	4.3	4.9	3.0	2.7	50.7
48th		Papua New Guinea	7.2	7.1	6.3	6.1	9.1	7.4	6.8	9.0	7.6	7.8	5.2	6.8	86.4
99th		Paraguay	6.6	7.8	5.8	5.0	7.9	5.8	7.0	6.2	5.9	5.7	3.1	4.8	71.6
104th		Peru	7.1	6.9	7.4	3.2	7.4	7.3	7.2	6.7	4.3	5.0	4.3	3.5	70.3
54th		Philippines	9.7	8.0	7.9	5.5	5.7	6.5	7.0	6.7	6.6	7.5	6.9	6.4	84.4
151st		Poland	1.8	4.2	5.4	3.6	3.0	4.5	3.3	2.3	3.2	3.0	3.6	2.9	40.8
164th		Portugal	1.3	2.5	2.5	5.3	2.5	2.2	1.6	2.2	1.8	2.1	2.2	2.8	29.0
146th		Qatar	2.6	5.0	4.6	2.1	4.7	2.6	6.3	1.3	6.3	3.8	2.0	2.7	44.0
136th		Romania	3.0	5.4	6.8	4.7	4.2	4.5	5.2	3.8	3.7	3.2	2.8	3.6	50.9
67th		Russia	8.9	8.1	8.8	5.2	6.2	4.0	8.5	4.2	9.2	4.6	5.8	5.7	79.2
34th		Rwanda	6.2	8.0	9.4	6.0	8.3	7.4	7.1	7.4	7.2	8.0	8.3	7.5	90.8
111th		Samoa	4.7	5.1	4.5	6.3	4.9	9.5	5.5	4.9	4.1	5.7	2.7	9.2	67.1

															
		C1	C2	C3	E1	E2	E3	P1	P2	P3	S1	S2	X1	Total	
		SA	FE	GG	EC	UD	HF	SL	PS	HR	DP	RD	EX		
97th		Sao Tome and Principe	5.0	6.3	4.5	8.5	6.0	8.5	5.6	5.9	3.3	6.2	4.4	7.9	72.1
101st		Saudi Arabia	6.3	8.2	7.8	4.5	5.0	3.8	8.0	3.8	9.1	5.3	4.7	4.7	71.2
60th		Senegal	6.2	6.6	6.4	7.4	7.4	8.0	4.7	7.5	6.0	8.1	7.3	6.7	82.3
107th		Serbia	5.5	8.0	7.3	6.4	4.8	5.3	5.2	4.2	4.4	4.3	8.4	6.2	70.0
125th		Seychelles	6.1	6.0	4.5	4.1	5.5	5.9	5.5	2.7	3.8	5.1	3.2	7.0	59.4
38th		Sierra Leone	4.3	7.8	6.2	8.6	8.3	8.5	6.9	8.8	5.3	9.0	7.7	7.9	89.3
161st		Singapore	1.6	4.0	2.6	2.0	3.8	3.3	3.9	1.3	4.6	2.5	1.7	1.2	32.5
144th		Slovakia	1.8	4.7	6.9	4.6	3.5	4.2	4.3	2.4	2.5	2.3	3.8	3.3	44.3
162nd		Slovenia	1.6	1.7	4.5	3.8	3.4	3.1	2.7	1.5	1.5	2.3	4.0	2.3	32.4
52nd		Solomon Islands	5.9	8.2	6.5	7.1	9.0	6.9	6.8	7.7	5.2	8.5	4.4	8.6	84.8
2nd		Somalia	9.4	10.0	8.9	8.9	9.3	9.8	9.3	9.0	9.5	10.0	10.0	9.3	113.4
96th		South Africa	6.1	6.1	6.7	7.1	7.5	5.5	6.5	7.0	4.2	7.2	5.4	3.0	72.3
154th		South Korea	2.1	4.3	2.9	2.0	3.0	3.9	4.4	1.9	2.9	3.1	2.0	5.6	38.1
1st		South Sudan	10.0	9.7	9.7	10.0	8.9	6.4	10.0	10.0	9.5	9.9	10.0	9.8	113.9
155th		Spain	2.8	6.3	5.7	5.2	3.5	1.9	2.8	2.2	1.8	2.0	1.9	1.8	37.9
47th		Sri Lanka	7.4	8.8	9.0	5.4	7.1	7.7	6.9	5.1	8.3	6.2	8.4	6.3	86.6
5th		Sudan	9.0	9.7	10.0	8.5	7.4	8.9	9.8	8.9	9.6	9.3	9.8	9.7	110.6
113th		Suriname	4.9	5.8	5.8	7.1	6.1	6.8	5.0	5.6	4.6	5.3	3.0	5.9	65.9
42nd		Swaziland	6.3	6.8	3.4	9.7	8.2	7.2	8.8	8.1	9.1	9.4	4.7	7.1	88.8
174th		Sweden	2.1	1.8	1.5	1.8	1.8	1.5	1.0	1.1	1.1	2.0	5.3	1.1	22.1
176th		Switzerland	1.1	1.0	3.6	2.3	2.2	2.1	1.0	1.0	1.8	1.5	2.5	1.0	21.1
5th		Syria	9.8	9.9	9.8	8.1	7.7	8.4	9.9	9.2	9.8	8.2	9.8	10.0	110.6
61st		Tajikistan	6.7	8.4	7.4	7.3	4.8	6.2	9.1	5.6	8.2	7.9	4.3	5.9	81.8
65th		Tanzania	5.5	5.7	5.2	6.2	7.1	7.6	5.9	8.6	5.9	8.7	6.7	7.2	80.3
82nd		Thailand	9.0	9.4	8.5	3.3	5.3	4.7	7.5	4.4	8.0	6.4	5.9	3.8	76.2
35th		Timor-Leste	7.2	8.3	6.5	7.9	6.8	7.6	6.9	8.5	5.3	9.7	6.3	9.5	90.5
56th		Togo	6.5	7.6	4.6	6.4	8.2	7.5	7.8	8.2	6.7	7.8	6.6	6.0	83.9
128th		Trinidad and Tobago	6.3	5.6	4.2	4.4	4.9	8.1	4.5	4.3	4.1	4.5	2.7	3.1	56.7
89th		Tunisia	8.3	7.8	7.7	6.7	4.9	6.1	6.5	4.4	6.5	4.2	4.7	6.4	74.2
64th		Turkey	8.3	9.1	10.0	4.6	5.7	3.9	7.6	4.4	7.7	4.9	9.2	5.4	80.8
86th		Turkmenistan	6.3	7.8	6.6	4.9	6.7	5.1	9.7	5.6	8.7	5.4	3.5	4.1	74.4
24th		Uganda	7.1	8.6	8.5	5.5	7.4	7.6	8.6	8.3	7.8	9.0	9.3	8.3	96.0
90th		Ukraine	7.6	8.0	6.7	6.8	4.2	5.2	8.2	3.7	6.2	4.2	4.6	8.6	74.0
147th		United Arab Emirates	3.1	3.6	3.4	2.4	3.4	2.5	6.7	2.2	7.8	4.0	2.2	2.4	43.7
160th		United Kingdom	2.7	4.5	6.4	3.6	3.6	2.1	1.5	1.6	1.7	2.4	2.1	1.0	33.2
158th		United States	3.2	5.3	6.0	2.4	4.3	1.7	1.9	1.6	3.2	2.8	2.0	1.2	35.6
157th		Uruguay	3.8	2.7	2.5	3.6	4.1	4.4	1.0	2.9	2.8	3.8	2.5	2.7	36.8
63rd		Uzbekistan	7.1	8.8	7.1	6.3	6.9	6.0	9.5	4.9	9.2	5.6	5.5	4.6	81.5
58th		Venezuela	7.3	8.2	7.2	7.3	6.7	5.5	8.5	7.7	8.9	5.6	4.6	5.4	82.9
105th		Vietnam	4.6	6.9	6.0	5.1	5.0	6.2	8.3	4.7	7.4	6.1	4.7	5.2	70.2
4th		Yemen	9.8	9.5	9.3	9.3	8.2	7.3	9.7	9.6	9.7	9.3	9.4	10.0	111.1
46th		Zambia	4.6	6.2	5.9	7.9	9.2	7.9	7.7	7.9	7.4	9.5	6.4	7.2	87.8
13th		Zimbabwe	8.1	9.8	7.3	8.6	8.5	7.9	9.2	8.9	8.2	9.1	8.5	7.5	101.6

FRAGILE STATES INDEX DECADE TRENDS 2007-2017



COUNTRY ABBREVIATIONS

AE	U.A.E.	DJ	DJIBOUTI	LI	LITHUANIA
AL	ALBANIA	DK	DENMARK	LV	LATVIA
AM	ARMENIA	EE	ESTONIA	LX	LUXEMBOURG
AT	AUSTRIA	ER	ERITREA	ME	MONTENEGRO
AZ	AZERBAIJAN	GE	GEORGIA	MK	MACEDONIA
BA	BOSNIA & H.	GQ	EQ. GUINEA	MW	MALAWI
BD	BANGLADESH	GR	GREECE	NL	NETHERLANDS
BE	BELGIUM	HU	HUNGARY	QA	QATAR
BF	BURKINA FASO	HV	CROATIA	RS	SERBIA
BG	BULGARIA	IL	ISRAEL	RW	RWANDA
BH	BAHRAIN	JO	JORDAN	SG	SINGAPORE
BI	BURUNDI	KG	KYRGYZ REP.	SI	SLOVENIA
BT	BHUTAN	KH	CAMBODIA	SK	SLOVAKIA
CG	CONGO (REP.)	KW	KUWAIT	TJ	TAJIKISTAN
CY	CYPRUS	LA	LAOS	TN	TUNISIA
CZ	CZECH REP.	LB	LEBANON	UG	UGANDA



FRAGILE STATES INDEX: DECADE TRENDS, 2007-2017

SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT	STRONG IMPROVEMENT	SOME IMPROVEMENT	MARGINAL IMPROVEMENT*
 -14.0 Cuba	 -10.0 Albania	 -6.0 Iraq	 -2.0 Czech Republic
 -13.7 Moldova	 -10.0 Romania	 -5.8 Estonia	 -2.0 Guyana
 -13.1 Turkmenistan	 -9.9 Croatia	 -5.8 Georgia	 -2.0 Russia
 -12.8 Belarus	 -9.9 Malta	 -5.3 Saudi Arabia	 -1.8 El Salvador
 -12.0 Uzbekistan	 -9.6 Brunei Darussalam	 -5.2 Bolivia	 -1.7 Burkina Faso
 -11.9 Seychelles	 -9.6 Qatar	 -5.1 Slovenia	 -1.7 Mongolia
 -11.6 Dominican Republic	 -8.7 Panama	 -5.0 Slovak Republic	 -1.6 South Korea
 -11.5 Bosnia & Herzegovina	 -8.5 Zimbabwe	 -4.9 Azerbaijan	 -1.3 Myanmar
 -11.5 Indonesia	 -8.0 Macedonia	 -4.8 Laos	 -1.3 Paraguay
 -11.1 Serbia	 -8.0 Suriname	 -4.7 Luxembourg	 -1.3 Spain
 -11.0 Cape Verde	 -7.9 Kyrgyz Republic	 -4.4 North Korea	 -1.2 Netherlands
 -10.9 Antigua & Barbuda	 -7.9 U.A.E.	 -4.4 Timor-Leste	 -1.2 Pakistan
 -10.9 Trinidad & Tobago	 -7.7 Bahamas	 -4.3 Belize	 -1.1 Morocco
 -10.8 Colombia	 -7.6 Vietnam	 -4.2 Lebanon	 -1.0 Mauritius
 -10.8 Cote d'Ivoire	 -7.6 Cyprus	 -4.2 Malawi	 -0.9 Australia
 -10.4 Bhutan	 -7.3 Lithuania	 -4.1 Sierra Leone	 -0.9 Namibia
 -10.3 Barbados	 -7.2 Solomon Islands	 -4.1 Uruguay	 -0.9 United Kingdom
 -10.3 Germany	 -6.9 Tajikistan	 -3.6 Kuwait	 -0.7 Denmark
 -10.3 Latvia	 -6.8 Bangladesh	 -3.4 Portugal	 -0.7 Israel & West Bank
 -10.1 Grenada	 -6.8 Poland	 -3.2 Equatorial Guinea	 -0.6 France
	 -6.7 Maldives	 -3.1 Sudan	 -0.5 Malaysia
	 -6.7 Samoa	 -2.7 Togo	 -0.5 Singapore
	 -6.6 Bulgaria	 -2.6 Botswana	 -0.4 Uganda
	 -6.5 China	 -2.6 Ecuador	 0.0 Cambodia
	 -6.5 Sri Lanka	 -2.6 Nepal	
	 -6.5 Sao Tome	 -2.6 Nicaragua	
	 -6.4 Costa Rica	 -2.5 Canada	
	 -6.4 Kazakhstan		
	 -6.1 Peru		

* Also includes countries that recorded insignificant change, denoted by *italics*.

MARGINAL WORSENING*

	+0.1	Jamaica
	+0.1	Montenegro
	+0.2	Finland
	+0.2	Thailand
	+0.4	Congo (Republic)
	+0.5	Gabon
	+0.5	Lesotho
	+0.6	Chad
	+0.6	Egypt
	+0.7	Armenia
	+0.8	Hungary
	+0.9	Algeria
	+0.9	Liberia
	+0.9	Switzerland
	+1.0	Tanzania
	+1.1	Guinea
	+1.2	Fiji
	+1.2	Philippines
	+1.3	Brazil
	+1.3	P.N.G.
	+1.4	Iceland
	+1.6	Rwanda
	+1.7	Austria
	+1.7	Guatemala
	+1.7	Mexico
	+2.0	United States













SOME WORSENING

	+2.1	Jordan
	+2.1	New Zealand
	+2.3	Somalia
	+2.6	Ukraine
	+2.8	Ireland
	+2.8	Sweden
	+2.9	Micronesia
	+3.0	Iran
	+3.1	Venezuela
	+3.4	Norway
	+3.7	Burundi
	+4.3	Honduras
	+4.4	Haiti
	+4.5	Congo (D.R.)
	+5.0	Afghanistan
	+5.1	Kenya
	+5.3	Belgium
	+5.6	Benin
	+5.8	Ethiopia
	+5.9	Turkey
	+6.0	Nigeria

WORSENING

	+6.2	Angola
	+6.2	Cameroon
	+6.2	Niger
	+6.8	Argentina
	+7.0	Comoros
	+7.0	Mauritania
	+7.0	Oman
	+7.1	India
	+7.2	Zambia
	+7.3	Chile
	+7.5	Madagascar
	+7.5	Swaziland
	+7.8	Ghana
	+7.9	Bahrain
	+8.1	Italy
	+8.6	Djibouti
	+8.6	Tunisia
	+8.9	Japan

SIGNIFICANT WORSENING

	+10.7	Guinea-Bissau
	+11.6	Central African Rep.
	+12.1	Mozambique
	+12.6	Eritrea
	+13.4	Gambia
	+14.0	Greece
	+14.9	South Africa
	+15.4	Senegal
	+17.4	Mali
	+17.9	Yemen
	+22.0	Syria
	+27.0	Libya

CRITICAL WORSENING

ABOUT THE FUND FOR PEACE

The Fund for Peace (FFP) works to prevent conflict and promote sustainable security globally by building relationships and trust across diverse sectors. Founded in 1957, FFP is an independent, nonpartisan, 501(c)(3) non-profit organization based in Washington, D.C. and Abuja, Nigeria.



Our objective is to create practical tools and approaches for conflict mitigation that are contextually relevant, timely, and useful to those who can help create greater stability. Our approach brings together local knowledge and expertise with innovative tools and technologies to help anticipate and alleviate the conditions that lead to conflict.

To date, FFP has worked in over 60 countries with a wide range of partners in all sectors. These include governments, regional and international organizations, the military, non-governmental organizations, academics, journalists, civil society networks, and the private sector. Our projects include supporting grassroots organizations, developing national dialogues, building the capacities of regional organizations, working to prevent gender-based violence, and taking leadership roles in international initiatives.

Combining social science techniques with information technology, we have produced the patented Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), a content analysis software product that provides a conceptual framework and a data gathering technique for measuring conflict risk. Annually, we produce The Fragile States Index, a ranking of 178 countries across 12 indicators of the risks and vulnerabilities faced by individual nations.

FFP specializes in building early warning networks and systems in complex environments. Working directly with local and international partners, we collect and analyze local,

national and regional data and trends. This information is then made publicly available in order to foster more informed decisions and policy making, as well as better coordinated approaches to peacebuilding. In addition to our early warning work with civil society, governments, and regional bodies from around the world, we also advise companies operating in complex environments on how to ensure they operate

responsibly, respecting human rights and promoting greater stability.

Most importantly, in all our work, we focus on building capacity among local actors so they can develop and implement informed and locally relevant solutions. We believe that is key to truly sustainable human security.

CONFLICT RISK ASSESSMENT ADVISORY SERVICES

FFP provides conflict risk assessment Advisory Services for a variety of clients including governments, multilateral institutions and companies. FFP is able to provide tailored assessments that focus on the regional-, national-, or provincial-level. FFP also provides training programs for policymakers and field practitioners who wish to apply the CAST conflict assessment framework to assess conflict drivers and analyze risk. Further, FFP has assisted some clients in developing specialized, made-for-purpose conflict and risk assessment tools, frameworks, and platforms, such as for organizations that are focused on specific regions, or for investors who seek to better analyze the social, economic and political risks of potential investments.

For more information, contact us at
inquiries@fundforpeace.org.

BEYOND FRAGILE STATES INDEX: THE FUND FOR PEACE IN THE FIELD

Right: Conflict Assessment workshop in Kenya.

Below: Violence Against Women & Girls Workshop in Nigeria.

Far Below Left: Community focus group in Mali.

Far Below Right: Interviews with traditional leaders in Cote d'Ivoire.



Left: CAST training.

Below: Security and human rights assessment in Cameroon.



Above: Community Engagement in Papua New Guinea.

Right: Multi-stakeholder human rights dialogues in Ghana.





www.fundforpeace.org